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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

,_;;

DEBBRA JO CLARK,

Case No. 20140955-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) (2012). See
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: The defense witness admitted during cross-examination that she had been

convicted of a crime and that Clark's boyfriend was listed on the Information as her codefendant. Despite this, the court admitted the witness's Information and Arrest Warrant
as impeachment evidence for the purpose of showing that Clark's boyfriend was listed on
the Information as a co-defendant. The question on appeal is whether the court abused its
discretion by admitting the Information and Arrest Warrant.
Standard ofReview and Preservation: A trial court's decision admitting evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79,,r8, 67 P.3d

1005. This issue is preserved by objection. R.174:150; see infra Part LG.I; Addendum B.
Alternatively, this issue may be addressed for plain error. See infra Part I.G.2.
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following are in Addendum C: U.S. Const. amend. VI; Utah
R.Evid.401,402,403,611,801, 802,803,804,807,901,902.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

a.

Procedural History.
Following Clark's arrest at a Smith's grocery store on November 30, 2013, she

was charged by Information with one count of Retail Theft, third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code §76-6-602 (2012) and §76-6-412(l)(b)(ii) (2014), 1 and one count
of Criminal Trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §76-6-206(2)(b)
(2012). R.1-2. Following a preliminary hearing, Clark was bound over as charged. R.4142; 67-83. Before trial, Clark filed a motion to bifurcate, requesting a bench trial on the
Retail Theft enhancement and on the Criminal Trespass count. R.100-03. Following a
hearing, the trial court granted Clark's motion. R.109-1 0; 174:4-5; 193:31-33.
A jury trial was held on August 27, 2014. R.146-49; 174. Before the jury, each
party called one witness to testify: The State called Bobbie Davis, a loss prevention
officer for Smith's, and the defense called Debbie Larsen. R.174. The State originally
objected to Larsen's testimony because Clark did not provide a witness list. R.85-87;

1

The State conceded below that the 2014 version of section 76-6-412 applies in this case.
R.174:194-202.
2

.J

174:6-8, 52-54. After talking to Larsen, however, the prosecutor withdrew the objection.
....J

R.174: 122-23.
On cross-examination, the State questioned Larsen about her conviction for Theft
by Deception. R.174:141-47. Larsen admitted the conviction and admitted that Clark's
boyfriend, Christian Hale, was listed as her co-defendant on the Information. R.174:14549. Larsen explained, however, that she believed there was a mix-up on the Information
and that Hale was not actually her co-defendant because his name did not appear on her
court paperwork and he was not present at her court hearings. R.174:145-49. Over
·...i)

objection, the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 2 as impeachment evidence for the
purpose of showing that Hale was listed on the Information as Larsen's co-defendant.
R.174:149-50. State's Exhibit 2 was a complete copy of the Information and Arrest
Warrant related to Larsen's Theft by Deception conviction. 2 R.174: 149-50.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Retail Theft. R.144; 174: 196. Outside the
presence of the jury, the trial court heard evidence and argument on the Retail Theft
enhancement. R.174:200-02. The court then found Clark guilty of Retail Theft, a third
degree felony, and of Criminal Trespass. R.17 4: 193, 200-02. Thereafter, the court
sentenced Clark to serve a prison term of zero-to-five years for Retail Theft and a jail
term of 180 days for Criminal Trespass. R.162-64; 194:12-13. The court suspended the
sentences, placed Clark on probation for 36 months, and ordered Clark to serve 365 days
in jail. R.162-64; 194:12-16. Clark filed a timely notice of appeal. R.168.

2

A redacted copy of State's Exhibit 2 is located at Addendum D. The original State's
Exhibit 2 is not redacted and is located at R.175.
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b.

The State's Evidence.
Davis, the loss prevention officer, described the alleged offense as follows. On

November 30, 2013, Clark and Larsen arrived at Smith's grocery store together but
entered the store separately. R.17 4: 109. Clark entered first. R.17 4: 109. Davis had met
Clark before. R.174:75-76. During the prior meeting, Davis had "trespassed" Clark and
"asked her to never come back into any Smith's again." R.174:76.
When Davis saw Clark, she called the police and "maintained visual on" Clark.
R.174:75-76. According to Davis, this meant that she followed Clark and "maintained
visual" on Clark even if she "had to get down on [her] knees" to do it. R.174:76, 101.
Though Davis denied concealing herself, she admitted that she positioned herself in a
way that Clark could not see her and watched Clark though wire racks. R.174:98-99, 101.
Clark, who was carrying a large purse, walked down the home improvement aisle
to the Command hooks area. R.174:77-79, 91, 95-98. Davis watched Clark from the front
of the aisle, 60 to 70 feet away, and saw Clark select two to three items from the shelf.
R.174:77. Clark then walked along the aisle at the back of the store to the seasonal
department. R.174:78, 99-100. Davis followed Clark by walking along the aisle at the
front of the store. R.174:78.
The seasonal department contained "big displays." R.174:78-79. According to
Davis, it is an area "free from view of other customers or employees." R.174:78-79. In
Davis's opinion, Clark did not appear to be shopping in the seasonal department.
R.174:79. "Her eyes were darting" around, and she went behind a "blow-up snowman,"
where there was no "small merchandise" to look at. R. 174:79, 113. Davis concluded that
4

Clark went behind the snowman so "she couldn't be seen." R.174:79. While in the
seasonal department, Clark put the items she had taken from the shelf into her purse.
R.174:78-79, 114-15. Davis could not see Clark's whole body at that time, but she could
see Clark's hands and mid-torso. R.174:79, 102.
Clark then walked back along the aisle at the back of the store and turned up an
aisle that led to the front of the store and the exit. R.174:80-81, 86, 103-04. Davis again
followed Clark by walking along the aisle at the front of the store. R.174:80-81.
At trial, Davis described Clark's movements as deliberate, saying that Clark
walked "straight down" the home improvement aisle to the Command hooks area,
"quickly walked" to and from the seasonal department, and headed "straight for the exit"
without "looking for anything else." R.174:77-81, 91, 95-100, 103-04. At the preliminary
hearing, however, Davis testified that Clark "wandered" to the Command hooks area,
"wandered" to the seasonal department, and "wandered down an aisle" toward the exit.
R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04. When confronted about her inconsistent testimony, Davis said
that she "misspoke" at the preliminary hearing. R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04, 111-13.
Davis testified that Clark saw her as Clark neared the floral department at the front
of the store, which was "mere feet from the exit." R.174:87, 105, 116. Clark "made fullon eye contact with" Davis. R.174:88. According to Davis, Clark registered "shock" and
"panic." R.174:88. Clark then "quickly spun around and went" back into the aisles.
R.174:88, 118. Davis again followed Clark and, from fifteen feet away, observed Clark
remove items from her purse and "ditch[]" them on a shelf. R.174:88-89, 117. According
to Davis, Clark also watched "to see if [Davis] was still following her." R.174:89.

5
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Clark then went down one aisle and up the next toward the exit. R.174:90. Davis
and two assistants stopped Clark before she exited and told Clark that the police were
coming. R.174:90. Clark asked Davis why she was stopping her, and Davis "informed
her of the criminal trespass." R. 174:91. Clark said, "I didn't steal anything" and opened
her purse. R.174:91. The purse was "completely empty." R.174:91.
Davis took Clark to the loss prevention office. R.174:90. After the police arrived,
Davis said to Clark, '" What are you doing in my store? You had been trespassed."'
R.174:91. Clark responded that she "knew that she was trespassed" and said that "she
didn't know why she was there." R.174:91. Davis asked Clark if she had come to the
store with anyone else, and Clark responded that she had come with Larsen. R.174:92.
After receiving a call from the service desk and reviewing security footage, Davis
determined that Larsen was at the service desk attempting to return Command hooks
without a receipt. R.174:92-93, 107. Davis stopped Larsen at the service desk. R.174:9293. According to Davis, Larsen "willingly handed" the hooks to Davis, saying that "she
did not want them" and that she did not want to complete the return. R.17 4: 108, 11 7.
Larsen was permitted to leave the store. R.174: 108. Davis then retrieved the items that
Clark had "ditched" on a shelf, and the police arrested Clark. R.174:93-94.
Davis claimed that the items she retrieved from the shelf were hooks like those
that Larsen had been trying to return without a receipt. R.174:93-94, 107. The State did
not produce the items from the shelf or the hooks that Larsen attempted to return.
R.174:107-08, 117. Davis testified that all of the items, including the hooks that Larsen
~-

attempted to return, had been "put back into stock" and sold. R.174: I 07-08.

6

c.

The Defense Evidence.
Larsen testified as follows. Larsen and Clark are friends. R.174:126. They went to

Smith's together on November 30 because Larsen had items to return and Clark was
shopping for "stuff for dinner." R.174: 127. They had decided to have dinner together,
and Clark was going to cook. R.174:136.
Larsen planned to return three medications, for which she had receipts, and "two
hooks," for which she did not. R.174: 127. Her boyfriend had purchased the hooks for her,
and "he never keeps his receipts." R.174: 128, 133, 135. She returned the hooks because
they were too wide for the wall where she planned to use them. R.174: 128, 130, 135.
Clark entered the store first because Larsen had to settle her dog in the car before
going in. R.174:128, 137. When Larsen entered the store, she went to the service desk.
R.174: 128-29. There, after waiting her tum, she approached the desk to return the items
and explained that she did not have receipts for the hooks because her boyfriend does not
keep receipts. R.174: 129, 133-34. The clerk said that was fine and that Larsen would
receive a gift card for the return. R.174: 133-34.
When the transaction was nearly complete, Davis approached Larsen and asked if
she was with Clark. R.174: 128-29. Larsen responded that she was, and Davis accused her
of having Clark hand off stolen items to her. R.17 4: 128-31. Davis then took Larsen's
photograph and told Larsen "not to come in their store ever again." R.174: 129-31.
Larsen testified that she "begged" Davis to review the security footage because it
would show that she had not even passed Clark in the store. R.174: 131-32. Davis "started
just screaming at me and wouldn't listen to me." R.174:131-32. Larsen was not charged
7
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with a crime. R.174: 132. She left the store with the medication and the hooks and
returned the items at a different Smith's store. R.174: 131-32.

d.

The State's Cross-Examination of Larsen and Rebuttal Evidence.
During cross-examination, the State asked Larsen when she had last seen Clark's

boyfriend, Christian Hale. R.174: 139-41. Larsen responded that she had seen Hale about
a month before November 30. R.174:141. The State asked if that was the time Larsen and
Hale "were passing forged checks." R.174:141. Defense counsel objected. R.174:141.
After hearing argument, the trial court permitted the State to admit evidence that Larsen
had been convicted of Theft by Deception, a class A misdemeanor. R.174:141-44.
Although the State misstated the conviction as forgery, a third-degree felony,
Larsen readily admitted the conviction. R.174: 145. Defense counsel objected because the
State had misstated the conviction, and the court corrected the record: "Members of the
jury, you are instructed that Ms. Larsen was not convicted of a third-degree felony
forgery. She was convicted of a class A misdemeanor theft by deception." R.174:146.
Defense counsel also corrected the record. R.17 4: 151. Counsel stipulated to the
conviction, and the Judgment was not admitted into evidence. R.174: 155-56.
In questioning Larsen about the conviction, the State asked Larsen if she was
charged with Hale. R.174:145. Larsen responded, "[W]e weren't charged together. We
never went [to court] together." R.174: 145. When the State showed Larsen the
Information, which contained both her name and Hale's name, Larsen admitted that
Hale's name was on the Information but explained, "There was some mix-up in my court

8

case, because they said that for some reason he is tacked on the end of mine, when we
never had trial together, never had court together or nothing at all." R.174: 145-46.
Larsen testified that she and Hale both received forged checks from the same
person, J.D. Cook, and that they both cashed the forged checks, but that they did not do it
together. R.174:146-49. She explained that Cook made a check out in her name and that
she took it to Wells Fargo and cashed it. R.17 4: 146-47. She did not know it was forged at
the time, but she learned it was forged after she cashed it. R.174:147-49. She pleaded
guilty because she wanted to avoid a felony conviction and because she kept the money
even after she learned that the check was forged. R.174: 149, 153-56.
Larsen testified that she did not "know why" she and Hale were listed on the same
Information. R.174:146. She stated that "Hale was not in my court papers." R.174:149.
She and Hale received forged checks from the same person, but they did not cash the
checks together or go to court together. R.174:149-50. Larsen did not even know when
Hale cashed his check. R.174: 148. Larsen said that her probation officer told her that
Hale's name being on same Information as hers was "a mix-up." R.174:150.
The State moved to admit State's Exhibit 2, which contained the complete
Information and Arrest Warrant from Larsen's Theft by Deception case, arguing that it
impeached Larsen because the Information listed Hale as a co-defendant and Larsen
"stated that Christian Hale was never on her court documents." R.174:149-50.
Defense counsel objected that State's Exhibit 2 could not be used to impeach since
it contained allegations, not convictions: "[A]n Information is allegations not a
conviction. And ... I'm not sure how ... allegations [are] impeachment material."
9

R.174:150. Counsel also objected because the line of questioning was not relevant and,
even if it was, State's Exhibit 2 contained additional evidence that was not relevant: "[I]t
is not just going to whether [Larsen and Hale] were charged together, which, by the way,
I don't think is relevant here." R.174:150. Additionally, counsel objected because State's
Exhibit 2 did not actually impeach Larsen: Larsen "is not an attorney. She doesn't know
how court dockets work, how people are charged." R.174:150. The trial court overruled
defense counsel's objections and admitted State's Exhibit 2. R.174:150.
The State also called Davis back to the stand to provide rebuttal testimony. Davis
testified that when she asked Larsen whether Larsen knew Clark, Larsen acted confused
and said that she came to the store alone. R.174:158-59. Davis then confronted Larsen,
saying, "' Are you sure you didn't arrive here with somebody? Because I just watched on
video you arriving in a vehicle with a woman that I have upstairs .... And she admitted
that she came here with you."' R.174: 158. Larsen responded, "'Oh, well, she asked me to
do this return."' R.174: 158. Davis said, '"Okay, well, we are going to keep this
merchandise, and you are free to leave."' R.174:158. Larsen responded, "'Okay, I don't
want nothing to do with this,"' and left. R.174:158. Davis recalled that she spoke to
Larsen calmly but that Larsen was agitated. R.17 4: 159-60. Davis could not recall whether
Larsen had merchandise with her other than the hooks, but Davis recalled that Larsen did
not take the hooks with her when she left the store. R.174:160-61.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by admitting State's Exhibit 2 because the
exhibit was irrelevant, its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the
10

danger of unfair prejudice, it was not authenticated, it was inadmissible hearsay, and it
violated Clark's right to confrontation.
First, State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant. Rule 402 excludes irrelevant evidence.
Contradiction evidence is irrelevant if it does not contradict the witness's testimony or if
it is offered in response to a collateral matter brought up during cross-examination. Here,
State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant because it did not contradict Larsen's testimony and it
was offered to impeach a collateral matter raised during cross-examination.
Second, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 403 because its probative
value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence is
unfairly prejudicial if it tends to encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning.
Here, State's Exhibit 2 had no probative value or, if it did, the value was substantially
outweighed by the danger that it would unfairly undermine Larsen's credibility and
encourage the jury to convict based on improper reasoning such as guilt by association.
Third, State's Exhibit 2 was not authenticated. To be received in evidence, a
document must be authenticated. Here, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible because it did
not meet the authentication requirements of rules 901 and 902.
Fourth, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under the hearsay rules. To be
admissible, testimony must not be hearsay or must qualify for an exception to the hearsay
rule. Here, State's Exhibit 2 was hearsay and did not qualify under the business records
exception, the public records exception, or any other exception to the hearsay rule.
Finally, State's Exhibit 2 violated the Confrontation Clause. Testimonial hearsay
is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity to
11

cross-examine. State's Exhibit 2 was testimonial because it was made with an eye toward
prosecution, and it was inadmissible because the State made no showing that the
declarants were unavailable or that there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
This Court should reverse because State's Exhibit 2 prejudiced Clark. There was
no physical evidence to support the State's case for Retail Theft. The question for the jury
was whether to believe Davis's claim that Clark engaged in retail theft or Larsen's claim
that Davis was overly suspicious and jumped to the wrong conclusion. There is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have believed Larsen had State's Exhibit 2 not
been admitted. First, Larsen offered a compelling reason to believe her testimony despite
her friendship with Clark and her conviction for Theft by Deception. Second, there was
evidence to support a finding that Davis's testimony was unreliable because she prejudged Clark and her memory had been colored by her desire to see Clark convicted.
Third, the record suggests that the jury found Larsen's testimony persuasive despite the
improper impeachment. Finally, the court did not give a limiting instruction, meaning the
jury was free to consider State's Exhibit 2 for improper purposes.
This issue is preserved or can be reviewed for plain error.

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING
STATE'S EXHIBIT 2 INTO EVIDENCE

The admissibility of evidence at trial is governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
See Utah R.Evid. lOl(a), l IOI(a). '"Character evidence is evidence of a person's general

propensity, such as the propensity to be honest or truthful. It refers to broad, cross12

situational traits-propensities that supposedly influence a wide range of conduct."'
State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,if28, 318 P.3d 1221 (emphasis in original).
Character evidence is governed by the character evidence rules, such as rules 404, 607,
608, and 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,,r27. But if
impeachment evidence is not "offered to establish [a witness's] character or character
trait," it is not character evidence. Id. ,r,r27-29. "[E]xtrinsic evidence offered for other
grounds of impeachment (such as contradiction, prior inconsistent statement, bias and
mental capacity)" is not governed by the character evidence rules. Id. if29. The same is
true of "evidence used to directly rebut a witness's testimony or other evidence." Id. The
admissibility of such evidence is governed by "Rules 402 and 403." Id.; see State v.

Kamrowski, 2015 UT App 75,,r8, ---P.3d---. Such evidence is also subject to the
authentication rules, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. See U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Utah R.Evid. lOl(a), 1 lOl(a).
State's Exhibit 2 was the complete Information and Arrest Warrant filed against
Larsen in a separate criminal action pertaining to an unrelated matter. R.17 4: 150. The
trial court did not admit State's Exhibit 2 to impeach Larsen's character. R.174: 145-50.
Rather, the court admitted the exhibit to impeach Larsen by contradicting her crossexamination testimony. R.174: 145-50. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was not character evidence
governed by the character evidence rules. See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,,r27. Rather, it
was contradiction evidence governed by "Rules 402 and 403." Id. ,r29. It was also
governed by the authentication rules, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. See
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Utah R.Evid. lOl(a), 1 IOI(a).
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This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
State's Exhibit 2 into evidence. First, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 402
because it was irrelevant. See infra Part I.A. Second, it was inadmissible under rule 403
because its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. See infra Part J.B. Third, it was
inadmissible under rules 901 and 902 because it was not authenticated. See infra Part LC.
Fourth, it was inadmissible under the hearsay rules because it was hearsay and did not
qualify for any exception to the hearsay rule. See infra Part I.D. Finally, it was
inadmissible because it violated Clark's right to confrontation. See infra Part I.E. This
Court should reverse because the exhibit prejudiced Clark. See infra Part I.F. Finally, this
issue is preserved or should be reviewed for plain error. See infra Part I.G.

A.

State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible under Rule 402 Because It Was
Irrelevant

Rule 402 states that "[r]elevant evidence is admissible" and "[i]rrelevant evidence
is not admissible." Utah R.Evid. 402. Rule 401 says that "[e]vidence is relevant if (a) it
has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable that it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Utah R.Evid. 401.
"Where evidence 'has no probative value to a fact at issue, it is irrelevant and is
inadmissible under rule 402."' State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79,ifl5, 67 P.3d 1005.
On cross-examination, a party may inquire into "matters affecting the witness's
credibility." Utah R.Evid. 61 l(b). "[O]nce [a witness] offers evidence or makes an
assertion as to any fact, the State may cross-examine or introduce on rebuttal any
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testimony or evidence 'which would tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt upon the
credibility of [the witness's] testimony."' Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,,I30; see State v.
Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah 1977) (same).

But "[c]ross-examination should not go beyond ... matters affecting the witness's
credibility." Utah R.Evid. 611 (b). "Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item
of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter
properly provable in the case." Fed. R.Evid. 401, Adv. Committee Note. The rule
permitting a party to cross-examine or introduce on rebuttal any evidence which tends to
cast doubt on the credibility of the witness's testimony "cannot be employed as a pretext
for the admission of evidence that is in itself incompetent and prejudicial." Bingham
Mines Co. v. Bianco, 246 F. 936, 937 (8th Cir. 1917).

In this case, State's Exhibit 2 was not relevant "to any elements of the crime
[allegedly] committed by [Clark]." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 291 (Utah Ct.App.
1998), ajf'd on other grounds, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243. Its only potential relevance
"was to cast doubt on the credibility of [Larsen], the ground upon which [the State]
sought to have it admitted." State v. Stewart, 925 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah Ct.App. 1996).
"For this kind of evidence to be admissible, the party offering the evidence must
lay a sufficient foundation to show the evidence is relevant." Id. Further, when the
evidence is offered to contradict a statement made by the witness during crossexamination, the party must also show that the evidence relates to a matter that is
'"material and relevant."' Davenport v. State, 519 P.2d 452,454 (Alaska 1974).
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Here, State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant because the State (a) failed to lay a
sufficient foundation of relevancy, and (b) failed to show that the evidence related to a
matter that was material and relevant at trial.
].

State's Exhibit 2 Was Inadmissible Because the State Failed to Establish
a Foundation of Relevancy.

The State offered State's Exhibit 2 "to cast doubt on" Larsen's credibility. Stewart,
925 P.2d at 600. "For this kind of evidence to be admissible, the party offering the
evidence must lay a sufficient foundation to show the evidence is relevant." Id. To lay a
sufficient foundation of relevancy, the party must show that the evidence actually casts
l-.
1,\:/.1

doubt on the witness's credibility. See id.; Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 291.
In Finlayson, for instance, this Court held that expert testimony "was irrelevant
and therefore inadmissible" because "defendant did not lay a proper foundation" of
relevancy. Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 292. There, defendant was charged with raping a
Japanese student. Id. at 286. Defendant proposed to present expert testimony that
"Japanese cultural values" require a Japanese woman to '"save face"' by manufacturing a
rape after premarital sexual intercourse. Id. at 291. The trial court excluded the evidence,
and this Court affirmed. This Court held that the evidence was irrelevant because
defendant failed to establish a proper foundation of relevancy by "show[ing] that the
victim was aware of such Japanese cultural values" and "was likely to act in conformity
with these values." Id. at 291; see Stewart, 925 P.2d at 600-03 (defendant failed to lay
foundation of relevancy for evidence of witness's mental illness where defendant failed
to show that the illness (1) "affect[ed] the witness's ability to accurately perceive, recall,
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and relate events" and (2) "existed either at the time of the event regarding which the
witness ha[ d] been called to testify, or at the time testimony [wa]s given").
Here, the State failed to establish a foundation of relevancy for State's Exhibit 2
because the exhibit did not cast doubt on Larsen's credibility. Larsen admitted that she
was convicted of Theft by Deception for her role in the check-cashing scheme.
R.174:141-45. She also admitted that Hale cashed a similar check, was charged for his
involvement in the same check-cashing scheme, and was listed on the same Information.
R.174:145-50. The testimony that the State proposed to impeach was Larsen's statement
that she believed there was "some mix-up" in listing her and Hale as co-defendants on the
same Information. R.174:145-46. Larsen explained that she believed there was a mix up
because she and Hale "weren't charged together," they "never went [to court] together,"
Hale's name "was not in [her] court papers," and her probation officer told her that it was
"a mix-up." R.174: 145, 149-50.
But Larsen's testimony that she believed there was a "mix-up" in listing her and
Hale on the same Information was not a lie to be impeached. R.174:145-50. Rather, it
was simply her understanding of how her case proceeded through the criminal justice
system. R.174: 145-50. It is evident that Larsen did not have legal training and that her
understanding of the criminal justice system was imperfect. For example, though the
State misstated Larsen's conviction as forgery, a third-degree felony, Larsen still
admitted the conviction. R.174:145. In short, as stated by defense counsel, Larsen's
statement was not a lie to be impeached because Larsen "is not an attorney. She doesn't
know how court dockets work, how people are charged." R.174:150.
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Besides, even if Larsen's testimony regarding a possible "mix-up" on the
Information was the type of testimony that could be impeached, State's Exhibit 2 did not
impeach it. State's Exhibit 2 did not undermine the accuracy of Larsen's testimony that
Hale's name was on the Information but was not on her other court papers. See R.175.
Nor did it undermine the accuracy of Larsen's testimony that Hale was not present at her
initial appearance, where the charges were read, or at any of her other court hearings. See
id. On the contrary, it corroborated Larsen's testimony that she was convicted due to her

involvement in the check-cashing scheme, that Hale was involved in the same scheme,
and that her name and Hale's were on the same Information. See id.
In fact, though unnecessary to the decision, this Court may take judicial notice
from the court dockets in Larsen's and Hale's criminal cases that Larsen's understanding
of the court proceedings in her case was reasonable, if not accurate. See Utah R.Evid.
201(b)(2) ("The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned."); State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Utah
Ct.App. 1993) (taking judicial notice of a transcript from a different case where the
parties did not dispute the contents of the transcript); Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178
(Utah 1977) ("notice may be taken of the record of another case").
The court dockets show that Larsen's and Hale's cases proceeded separately under
different case numbers. See Addenda E, F. Hale's case was resolved in ECR (Early Case
Resolution)-He made his initial appearance on June 4, 2013, and pleaded guilty and was
sentenced two days later. See Addendum F. By contrast, Larsen's case began in ECR but
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was transferred to district court, where it received a new case number-Larsen made her
initial appearance on June 19, 2013, pleaded guilty on December 5, 2013, and was
sentenced on February 11, 2014. See Addendum E. In short, the court dockets confirm
Larsen's testimony that Hale was listed on the Information with her, but Hale was not on
her other court papers, present at her initial appearance, where the charges were read, or
present at any of her other court hearings. See Addenda E, F.
Given the court dockets, it is doubtful whether a document exists that could have
cast doubt on the credibility of Larsen's testimony that she believed there was a "mix-up"
on the Information. See Addenda E, F. Regardless, if there was such a document, it was
not State's Exhibit 2. As explained above, State's Exhibit 2 corroborated rather than
impeached Larsen's testimony. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant for impeachment
because the State failed to show that the exhibit actually cast doubt on Larsen's
credibility. See Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 291; Stewart, 925 P.2d at 600.

2.

State's Exhibit 2 Was Irrelevant Because the State Failed to Show that
the Evidence Related to a Matter that Was Material and Relevant at Trial

When evidence is offered to contradict a statement made by a witness during
cross-examination, the offering party must show that the evidence relates to a matter that
is '"material and relevant."' Davenport, 519 P .2d at 454. "[T]he answers of a witness
upon cross-examination on any irrelevant or collateral matter are conclusive and binding,
and the witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon an immaterial or collateral
matter of issue." State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Utah 1977). In other words, "a
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party is barred from impeaching a witness on a collateral matter through the use of
extrinsic evidence." United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2008).

'" It is generally stated that facts which would be independently provable are not
collateral."' Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Stated another way, "[t]he determination of
whether an issue is collateral or not turns on whether it is 'relevant for a purpose other
than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness."' Lipscomb, 539 F.3d at
39. "Specifically, the 'offered testimony must not only contradict a statement of [the
witness], but must also be material to [the defendant's] guilt or innocence.'" Id.
For instance, "facts which are relevant to the issue of the case" are not collateral.
Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Nor are "facts independently provable to impeach or

disqualify the witness," such as evidence "to show bias, interest, conviction of a crime or
lack of capacity or opportunity for knowledge of the facts related." Id. A "third type of
allowable contradiction" evidence is "the contradiction of any part of the witness's
account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a matter
of human experience he would not have been mistaken about if his story were true." Id.
This "third kind of fact" does not permit a party "to prove [a witness] wrong in some
trivial detail of time, place, or circumstance." Id. But if the "witness has told a story of a
transaction crucial to the controversy" and the opposing party proposes evidence "to
prove untrue some facts recited by the witness that if he were really there and saw what
he claims to have seen, he could not have been mistaken about," such evidence may be
admitted. Id.
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Thus, in Lipscomb, the district court correctly prevented the defendant from
introducing contradiction evidence. At trial in that case, "two detectives testified that they
observed [defendant] driving a green Jaguar with the license plate 'XM-82."' Lipscomb,
539 F.3d at 39. Defendant proposed to impeach the detectives with evidence that his
"green Jaguar was registered under a vanity license plate, 'SOVRN."' Id. The district
court denied defendant's request because the proposed line of impeachment was "a
collateral issue on which extrinsic evidence is inadmissible." Id. The appellate court
affirmed because defendant "failed to establish any independent and material ground for
admitting the ... evidence." Id. Rather, the evidence "was only relevant to impeaching the
detectives' credibility on a topic immaterial to [defendant]'s guilt." Id. Thus, "[t]he
district court did not abuse its discretion" by excluding the evidence. Id.
For similar reasons, the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
Government's proposed contradiction evidence in United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d
721 (10th Cir. 1977). During cross-examination in that case, the Government asked one
of the defendants whether he had "ever possessed any automatic weapons." Id. at 725.
When the defendant said he had not, the district court permitted the Government to
introduce a rifle found in the trunk of the defendant's car "purportedly to impeach the
testimony of [the] defendant[] after he had denied possessing any automatic weapon." Id.
at 724. The appellate court reversed, holding that "[i]t is not possible to justify the receipt
in evidence of this rifle on the basis of its being relevant." Id. at 725. The rifle was not
independently relevant because it "was never a part of this charge." Id. Further, the rifle
was not relevant for impeachment because "it is not permissible to impeach a witness on
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a collateral or irrelevant matter elicited on cross-examination." Id. at 726. Thus, the
appellate court remanded each defendant's case for a new trial. Id. at 730.
Whereas, in Mitchell, our supreme court held that defendant's contradiction
evidence should have been admitted because it "was not impeachment ... on a collateral
issue." Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. In that case, complainant took the stand and denied
that "she had ever sold heroin." Id. The trial court denied defendant's request to impeach
complainant's testimony with evidence that an undercover agent had twice bought heroin
from her. Id. On appeal, our supreme court reversed. Id. "There were two versions as to
what occurred at the [complainants'] residence." Id. The State claimed that "[n]arcotics
were not present or involved" in the incident. Id. Rather, "two armed robbers charged
into the home, terrorized the occupants, and took cash from [the complainants]." Id. On
the other hand, the defendant claimed that "no weapons were involved" and "no cash was
taken." Id. Rather, he was a "dissatisfied customer" who argued with complainant "over
the quality of the [narcotics] purchased" from her and stole a bag of narcotics. Id. Thus,
defendant's proposed impeachment evidence "was not a collateral issue" because
"[w]hether [complainant] in fact, distributed narcotics from her residence was, indeed, a
relevant issue in the case, which defendant was entitled to prove for a purpose
independent of impeaching [complainant's] testimony." Id.
Here, State's Exhibit 2 was not relevant because it was extrinsic evidence offered
to impeach Larsen on a collateral matter. See Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. The question of
whether Larsen and Hale were co-defendants in the check-cashing case "was not
independently relevant" to Clark's guilt or innocence. Warledo, 557 F.2d at 725; see
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Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Nor did Clark "voluntarily create any such issue" at trial.
Warledo, 557 F.2d at 726. "Rather, the [prosecutor] injected the issue himself by asking"
Larsen during cross-examination whether Hale was her co-defendant. Id. When Larsen
acknowledged that Hale was listed on the Information as her co-defendant but stated that
she believed listing Hale as her co-defendant was a "mix-up," the State offered State's
Exhibit 2 for impeachment. R.174: 149-50. As explained above, State's Exhibit 2 did not
,..i)

impeach Larsen's testimony. See supra Part I.A.I. But, even if it did, it was not relevant
because "it is not permissible to impeach a witness on a collateral or irrelevant matter
elicited on cross-examination." Warledo, 557 F.2d at 725.
In sum, as in Warledo and Lipscomb, State's Exhibit 2 was not relevant because it
was extrinsic evidence offered to "impeach[] a witness on a collateral matter." Lipscomb,
539 F.3d at 39. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 402.
B.

State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible under Rule 403 Because Its
Probative Value, If Any, Was Substantially Outweighed by the Danger
of Unfair Prejudice.

Even if State's Exhibit 2 contained some relevance for impeachment, it was
inadmissible under rule 403 because its probative value, if any, was substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
Rule 403 says that a "court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or]
misleading the jury." Utah R.Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if "'it tends to
encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning."' State v. Jones, 2015 UT
19,if30, 345 P.3d 1195; see State v. Toki, 2011 UT App 293,,I44, 263 P.3d 481.
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Rule 403 creates a "balancing framework." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60,iJ31, 296
P.3d 673. When applying rule 403, a court will balance the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect to ensure that matters of "'scant or cumulative
probative force"' are not "'dragged in by the heels for the sake of [their] prejudicial
effect."' State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct.App. 1989); cf. Verde, 2012 UT
60,iJl 8. "In short," a trial court applying "rule 403 seeks to balance two competing
concerns: 'excluding the ... evidence if its tendency to sustain a proper inference is
outweighed by its propensity for an improper inference or for jury confusion about its
real purpose."' State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215,iJ45, 335 P.3d 900.
Here, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 403. As explained above,
Clark's position is that State's Exhibit 2 had no probative value. See stpra Part I.A. Its
only potential relevance and the purpose for which it was offered was to cast doubt on
Larsen's credibility. See id.; R.174:149-50. But it was not relevant for that purpose
because it did not impeach Larsen's testimony and, even if it did, it was impeachment on
an irrelevant and collateral matter. See stpra Part I.A.
Even if State's Exhibit 2 has some scant probative value for impeachment, it was
inadmissible under rule 403 because the probative value, if any, was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the
jury. To the extent that any part of State's Exhibit 2 was relevant to impeach Larsen's
testimony, it was the portion of the Information's caption that listed Larsen and Hale as
co-defendants. See R.175. The remainder was irrelevant to impeachment. See supra Part
I.A. In fact, it corroborated rather than impeached Larsen's testimony. See id.
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On the other hand, State's Exhibit 2 was highly prejudicial. The evidence showed
that Larsen was Clark's close friend and that Hale was Clark's boyfriend. R.174: 126,
139. State's Exhibit 2 unfairly prejudiced Clark because it unfairly undermined Larsen's
credibility and created a danger that the jury would convict Clark based on a finding of
guilt by association.
State's Exhibit 2 was an official court document that painted Clark's good friend
Larsen and boyfriend Hale as dishonest thieves and repeat criminals, who had stolen not
just inexpensive retail items but large amounts of cash. The Information provided
Larsen's full name, birth date, address, driver's license number, and social security
number. See R.175. It listed four aliases for her. See id. It charged her with forgery, a
third degree felony, and listed the elements of forgery, including that she acted "with the
purpose to defraud." Id. It informed the jury that the check Larsen cashed was for nearly
$1,000 and gave a detailed account of the check-cashing scheme, the investigation, and
Larsen's admissions. See id. Further, the Arrest Warrant informed the jury that the
magistrate had found probable cause to support Larsen's arrest and "reasonable grounds
to believe" that Larsen could not be trusted to "appear upon a summons" and, therefore,
should be arrested "forthwith" at any time "day or night," pursued "into any other
county" if she had "fled justice," and required to post $5,000 bail. Id. Additionally, the
Information told the jury that the check Hale cashed was for nearly $1,000, that Hale
would be held under $5,000 bail, and that Hale was subject to enhanced penalties because
he had "been twice before convicted of Theft." Id.
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Such evidence was unfairly prejudicial and created a danger of confusing the
issues and misleading the jury because it encouraged the jury to find guilt from improper
reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,if37, 345 P.3d 1168 (noting the
danger of unfair prejudice in gang evidence due "to the potential prejudice of' guilt by
association"'); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984) (reversing for misconduct
where, among other things, prosecutor's reference to an alias "served no valid purpose"
and "very likely may have led the jury to speculate as to defendant's reason for using an
alias"); State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Utah 1983) ("Conviction ... cannot be had
on the basis of ... guilt by association."); United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 218, 220
(1st Cir. 1981) (upholding exclusion of conversation between defendant and informant
even though relevant because "could legitimately be found prejudicial by virtue of its
tendency to suggest a kind of 'guilt by association"'). Thus, even if State's Exhibit 2 had
some scant relevance, it was inadmissible under rule 403.

C.

State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible Because It Was Not Certified, as
Required by Rules 901 and 902 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

"By Utah law, any document, to be received in evidence, must be authenticated."

State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342,346 (Utah 1980). "Absent such authentication, no
competent evidence is before the court that the document is what it purports to be." Id.
"To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence,
the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what
the proponent claims it is." Utah R.Evid. 90l(a). For public records, the authentication
requirement may be satisfied by "[eJvidence that ... (A) a document was recorded or filed
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in a public office as authorized by law; or ... (B) a purported public record or statement is
from the office where items of this kind are kept." Utah R.Evid. 901(b)(7).

A copy of a public record is "self-authenticating," meaning it "require[s] no
extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted,"
if the copy is certified as correct by:
(4)(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification;
or
(4)(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of
the United States or of this state.
Utah R.Evid. 902(4).
State's Exhibit 2 did not "satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying
an item of evidence" outlined in rule 901. Utah R.Evid. 901 (a). The State did not even
attempt to "produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is." Utah R.Evid. 901(a). In particular, it did not produce evidence
that the exhibit "was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law" or that it
was "from the office where items of this kind are kept." Utah R.Evid. 901(b)(7). Thus,
the exhibit failed to satisfy the authenticity requirements of rule 901.
Nor was State's Exhibit 2 "self-authenticating" under rule 902. Utah R.Evid. 902.
"Rule 902 provides for the admissibility of certified copies of public records." State v.

Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545,550 (Utah 1996) (emphasis in original). Utah courts have
held that a court record that has not been certified is not self-authenticating. See, e.g.,

Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549-51 (reversing for lack of authentication where the State
offered into evidence a motion filed in the district court, signed by the prosecuting
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attorney, and stamped with the judge's name, because it "was not certified by any
official"); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 485-86 (Utah 1986) (reversing for lack of
authentication where the State, relying on defendant's parole officer, "offered into
evidence copies of certified copies of documents" showing prior convictions because ( 1)
parole officer, "not the Utah state prison warden, certified the copies," and (2) "[t]here is
no evidence to show how the copies got in [parole officer's] file, that the copies in
[parole officer's] file constituted official documents of the Division of Corrections, or
that [parole officer] was their official custodian or deputy custodian"); Lamorie, 610 P.2d
at 346 (reversing for lack of authentication where "the State produced copies of ... court
records, certified by a duly authorized notary public," because the notary "had no custody
of the documents"; the notary was not "a deputy of the court clerk, the official custodian
of the documents"; and "[n]owhere in the certification of the copy presented in court does
the clerk's signature appear").
State's Exhibit 2 was not self-authenticating under rule 902(4)(A) because it was
not "certified as correct by ... the custodian or another person authorized to make the
certification." Utah R.Evid. 902(4)(A). It was also not self-authenticating under rule
902(4)(B) because it was not "certified as correct by ... a certificate that complies with
Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of the United States or of this state." Utah R.Evid.
902(4)(B). Indeed, it was not certified at all. See R.175. Thus, as in Higginbotham, Long,
and Lamorie, State's Exhibit 2 should have been excluded because it was an uncertified
court record that lacked authentication. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549-51; Long, 721
P.2d at 485-86; Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346.
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D.

State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible Because It Was Hearsay and It
Did Not Qualify under Any Exceptions to the Rule against Hearsay.

Hearsay is "a statement that ... the declarant does not make while testifying at the
current trial or hearing; and ... a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement." Utah R.Evid. 801 (c). "Hearsay statements have been generally
discredited because they ... lack trustworthiness' and also because 'the person purporting
to know the facts is not stating them under oath."' In re K.D.S., 578 P .2d 9, 12 (Utah
1978). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by [the rules of
evidence]." Utah R.Evid. 802; see Utah R.Evid. 803, 804, 807.
Here, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible because it was hearsay and it did not
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule. State's Exhibit 2 was hearsay because it
was a statement that the declarant did not make while testifying at trial and that the State
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Utah R.Evid. 80l(c). First, State's
Exhibit 2 was a statement that the declarant did not make while testifying at trial. The
declarant of the Information was either "Pat Mount" or "M Falkner," who crossed out the
name "Pat Mount" and signed in Pat Mount's place. R.175. The Arrest Warrant was
signed by a magistrate judge. R.175. None of these people testified at trial. R.174.
Moreover, at least parts of State's Exhibit 2 were double or triple hearsay, see Utah
R.Evid. 805, because the declarant recounts statements made by "Pat Mount," "Troy
Hyde," and "David Timmerman." R.175. Second, the State offered State's Exhibit 2 to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. The State offered the exhibit in order to impeach
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Larsen by proving that Hale was Larsen's co-defendant in her Theft by Deception case. 3
R.174: 149-50. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was hearsay.
State's Exhibit 2 did not qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule. The rules
of evidence allow the admission of hearsay evidence under certain limited circumstances.
See Utah R.Evid. 803, 804, 807. The only exceptions that could apply here are the
exceptions for records of a regularly conducted activity and public records. See Utah
R.Evid. 803(6), 803(8). But State's Exhibit 2 did not satisfy either of these exceptions.
The exception for records of a regularly conducted activity provides that the
following is "not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness":
(6) A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:
(6)(A) the record was made at or near the time by-or from information
transmitted by-someone with knowledge;
(6)(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(6)(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(6)(0) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule
902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and
(6)(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Utah R.Evid. 803(6).
This exception was inapplicable because there is no evidence that State's Exhibit 2
met any of the necessary conditions. See Utah R.Evid. 803(6)(A)-(C). The State did not
3

As explained in Part I.A.I., State's Exhibit 2 it did not impeach Larsen's testimony.
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call "the custodian or another qualified witness" to testify that the conditions were met.
Utah R.Evid. 803(6)(D); see R.174. Nor was State's Exhibit 2 certified in a way "that
complie[d] with Rule 902(11) or (12)." Utah R.Evid. 803(6)(0). Rule 902(11), the rule
that applies to domestic records, such as State's Exhibit 2, requires "the custodian or
another qualified person" to certify that the document "meets the requirements of Rule
803(6)(A)-(C)." Utah R.Evid. 902(11). Here, as explained above, State's Exhibit 2 was
not certified at all, let alone certified that the document met "the requirements of Rule
803(6)(A)-(C)." Utah R.Evid. 902(11); see supra Part LC.
The public records exception provides that the following is "not excluded by the
rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness":
(8) A record or statement of a public office if:
(8)(A) it sets out:
(8)(A)(i) the office's activities;
(8)(A)(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not
including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement
personnel; or
(8)(A)(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case,
factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and
(8)(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a
lack of trustworthiness.
Utah R.Evid. 803(8). This exception was inapplicable because the State failed to establish
that State's Exhibit 2 was a public record under the rule. R.174. The exception is also
inapplicable because State's Exhibit 2 contained "matter[s] observed by law-enforcement
personnel," which rule 803(8) excludes in criminal cases. Utah R.Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii).
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Moreover, as recognized by this Court and our supreme court, police reports
offered by the State in support of its prosecution are too unreliable to qualify under the
business or public records exceptions of rule 803. See, e.g., State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d
1181, 1185-86 (Utah 1983); State v. Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,,r27, 293
P.3d 1121; Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); State v.
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292,298 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). As recognized in Bertul, Peronek,
Morrell, and Gonzalez-Camargo, "police reports made for the purpose of prosecuting an
offense and offered by the prosecution lack sufficient reliability so as to be admissible
under the business records exception" or the public records exception. Peronek, 803 P.2d
at 1297; see Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184; Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,,r27 {"The
State concedes that the admission of the incident report was prejudicial error."); Morrell,
803 P.2d at 298 (stating general rule that "[p]olice reports are not eligible for admission"
under the business or public records exceptions of rule 803). This is because such reports
are not made as part of regularly conducted business and are made with an eye toward
prosecution, thereby undermining their reliability. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S.Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009) (indicating that documents do not qualify for federal
business records exception where "the regularly conducted business activity is the
production of evidence for use at trial").
Like a police report, State's Exhibit 2, which contained an Information and the
accompanying Arrest Warrant, see Utah R.Crim.P. 6, was "made for the purpose of
prosecuting an offense." Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1297. An Information does not record
"simple routine matters" that "are based on first-hand knowledge of the maker of the
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report and do not involve conclusions"; nor are Informations prepared under
circumstances that "'indicate their trustworthiness."' Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185-86. On the
contrary, an Information is "an accusation in writing ... charging a person with a public
offense." Utah Code §77-1-3(3) (2012). It is prepared by police officers based on police
investigation and witness interviews with an eye toward prosecution. See Utah R.Crim.P.
4(b), U). Indeed, the Information commences the prosecution. See Utah Code §77-2-2(3)
(2012); Utah R.Crim.P. 5(a). It also gives "notice of the charge," State v. Angus, 581 P.2d
992, 995 n.8 (Utah 1978), and states allegations "sufficient to make out probable cause."
Utah R.Crim.P. 4(b). Thus, State's Exhibit 2 should have been excluded because it was
hearsay that did not qualify under any exceptions to the rule against hearsay.
E.

State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible Because It Violated Clark's
Right to Confrontation.

The right to confrontation is a "bedrock procedural guarantee [that] applies to both
federal and state prosecutions." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); see
U.S. Const. amend. VI. Regardless of whether evidence is admissible under the rules of
evidence, it may violate a defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 50-51.

"Crawford provides that, in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, testimonial
statements may be admitted only if the declarant is unavailable and if there has been a
prior opportunity for cross-examination." Salt Lake City v. George, 2008 UT App 257,,I8,
189 P.3d 1284; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. "The focus of the Confrontation Clause
is on witnesses who bear testimony against the accused." Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005
UT App 493,,I15, 128 P.3d 47. "'"Testimony," in tum, is typically "[a] solemn
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declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.""'
Id. "A witness's testimony against a defendant is ... inadmissible unless the witness
appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had the prior opportunity
for cross-examination." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531.
Although "Crawford did not provide a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"'
George, 2008 UT App 257,iJl 0, it made clear that "testimonial" "applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66. Indeed, "'[s]tatements taken by police
officers in the course of interrogations"' "qualify as testimonial under any definition."
Williams, 2005 UT App 493,iJ16 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 1354).
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court further clarified that police reports
made with an eye toward prosecution are testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 822 & n.l
(2006). To be testimonial, statements do not have to be made in response to police
interrogation. Id. They may be "volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended
questions." Id. Nor do statements have to be "reduced to a writing signed by the
declarant." Id. at 826. They may be "embedded in memory (and perhaps notes) of the
interrogating officer." Id. The test is whether the statements were made to the officer
primarily "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
investigation." Id. at 823, 826-27.
In short, "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of' an investigation
are testimonial in nature. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. Likewise, statements made to police
in order to establish events relevant to a criminal prosecution are testimonial. See Davis,
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547 U.S. at 822; George, 2008 UT App 257,,Ii[l l-13 (calibration certificates are not
testimonial because they are "prepared on a routine basis" using "preprinted language"
and they are "not accusatory as against any particular defendant"); Salt Lake City v.
Williams, 2005 UT App 493,,Il 7, 128 P.3d 47 (recognizing that "testimonial" includes

statements where "'a reasonable person ... would objectively foresee that his statement
might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime"').
/'.:\

\/6

"There is little doubt" that State's Exhibit 2 "fall[s] within 'the core class of
testimonial statements"' outlined in Crawford. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532. As
explained above, an Information is not a "routine" document prepared using "preprinted
language" and "not accusatory as against any particular defendant." George, 2008 UT
App 257,,I,Il 1-13; see supra Part I.D. On the contrary, it is "an accusation in writing" that
charges a particular defendant with a particular offense. Utah Code §77-1-3(3) (2012). It
is prepared by police officers with an eye toward prosecution. See Utah R.Crim.P. 4(b),
G). It contains a statement of probable cause that repeats statements made to police

officers primarily "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
investigation." Davis, 547 U.S. at 823, 826-27. And it relies on those statements to draw
conclusions about the charges to be brought against a particular defendant. See Utah
R.Crim.P. 4(b). Indeed, it commences the prosecution. See Utah Code §77-2-2(3) (2012);
Utah R.Crim.P. 5(a). Further, the accompanying Arrest Warrant is a signed declaration
that the magistrate believes there is probable cause to charge a particular person with a
particular offense, and, in this case, that the magistrate believes "defendant will not
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appear upon a summons" and that bail and an order to pursue if defendant flees are
warranted. See Utah R.Crim.P. 6; R.175.
In sum, '"a reasonable person ... would objectively foresee"' that an Information
and its accompanying Arrest Warrant would be used as part of a criminal prosecution.

Williams, 2005 UT App 493,,Il 7. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was testimonial and its
admission violated the Confrontation Clause because the State made no showing that the
declarants-the officers who prepared the Information, the witnesses who made
statements in support of the Information, and the magistrate who signed the Arrest
Warrant-were unavailable, or that Clark had been given "a prior opportunity for crossexamination." George, 2008 UT App 257,,I8.
F.

This Court Should Reverse Because the Admission of State's Exhibit 2
Prejudiced Clark.

This Court will "overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper evidence 'if
the admission of the evidence ... reasonably [a]ffect[ed] the likelihood of a different
f'.

~

verdict."' Toki, 2011 UT App 293,,I46. To show prejudice, a defendant need not show
"that the jury would have more likely than not" returned a different verdict but for the
error; rather, error is prejudicial if there is "a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,192, 152 P.3d 321.
When assessing prejudice, the appellate court will view the case "in light of the
'totality of the evidence,' not just the evidence supporting the verdict." State v. Barela,
2015 UT 22,131, ---P.3d--- (citation omitted). Even where the evidence suggests that "'it
is highly probable that a properly instructed jury would have"' convicted, the appellate
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court will reverse if "a properly instructed jury might still have" acquitted. Id.

,r,r28, 30

n.6. This is because the appellate court has "no way of knowing" what a properly
instructed jury would have done. Id. if30 n.6; see also State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116,
1121-22 (Utah 1989) (explaining that the prejudice analysis is different than the
sufficiency of the evidence analysis because it considers "all the evidence" and "focuses
on the taint caused by the error" rather than on the sufficiency of the untainted evidence).
Accordingly, in Barela, our supreme court reversed a rape conviction even though
the verdict suggested that the jury rejected defendant's testimony that complainant
instigated the sexual contact and accepted complainant's testimony that she did not
consent. Barela, 2015 UT 22,,r,I28-32. Despite the telling verdict, the court had "no way
of knowing how the jury processed the[] two stories." Id. if30. A properly instructed jury
"could have acquitted" based on a finding that even though defendant was the instigator
and complainant did not consent, defendant "had neither knowledge nor recklessness as
to [complainant]'s nonconsent." Id. if32. Because "a properly instructed jury might still
have rendered a verdict in [defendant's] favor" even though it rejected his testimony, the
error was "reasonably likely to have affected the verdict." Id. if28.
In this case, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable likelihood that
the result would have been different but for the improper admission of State's Exhibit 2.
There was no physical evidence or video evidence to support the State's case for retail
theft. R.174. For example, the State did not produce the hooks that Davis claimed she
took from Larsen and retained after Larsen left store. R. l 74: 107-08, 11 7. If the State had
been able to produce those hooks, it would have produced physical evidence to contradict
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Larsen's claim that she took the hooks with her when she left the store. But the State did
not produce any physical evidence to support its case. R.174.
Rather, the jury's decision came down to a weighing of credibility. The State's
case rested on Davis's claim that she saw Clark attempt to steal hooks from the Smith's
store. R.174. Whereas the defense case rested on Larsen's testimony that Clark was
simply shopping for items she needed to cook dinner that night and that Davis was overly
suspicious and jumped to the wrong conclusion. R.174.
But for the unfair prejudice of State's Exhibit 2, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury would have accepted Larsen's testimony. Larsen admitted that she was
Clark's friend and that she had been convicted of Theft by Deception. R.174:126, 145.
But these admissions did not necessarily impeach her testimony. On the contrary, a
reasonable jury could have believed Larsen's testimony despite these admissions. Larsen
was forthright about her criminal behavior, explaining what she had done and why.
R.174: 139-56. Larsen also provided a compelling reason to believe her testimony despite
her friendship with Clark and her criminal conviction. Larsen testified that she would not
lie for Clark because she believes people "should own their own ... problems."
R.174: 154. Larsen explained that she took responsibility for her criminal conduct by
pleading guilty, and she would expect Clark to do the same if she were guilty. R.174: 154.
Larsen testified that Davis jumped to conclusions about her and Clark. According
to Larsen, Davis approached her, immediately accused her of helping Clark steal items,
and "wouldn't listen to" her. R.174: 128-32. Then she took Larsen's photograph and told
Larsen "not to come in their store ever again." R.174:129-31. Despite the potential
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problems with Larsen's credibility, the jury could have believed Larsen's claim that
Davis was overly suspicious and jumped to conclusions. R.174: 128-32.
This is particularly true given that there was evidence outside of Larsen's
testimony to support the defense claim that Davis was overly suspicious and jumped to
the wrong conclusion about Clark. Davis herself admitted that she targeted Clark as a
shoplifter as soon as Clark entered the store. R.174:75-76. As soon as she saw Clark, she
called the police and started following Clark around the store. R.174:75-76. Davis's
testimony further suggested that she went to great lengths to keep an eye on Clark.
R.174:98-99, 101. She "maintained visual" on Clark the entire time Clark was in the store
even getting "down on [her] knees" when she had to. R.174:76, 101. Though Davis
denied concealing herself from Clark, she admitted that she positioned herself in a way
that Clark could not see her and that she spied on Clark though wire racks. R.174:98-99,
101. The jury could have viewed Davis's testimony as the testimony of someone who
pre-judged Clark and whose interpretations of Clark's movements were unreliable.
Further, Davis provided inconsistent testimony that suggested her memory might
have been affected by her desire to see Clark convicted. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255,
1270 (Utah 1987) (officers "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime"' may fail to objectively assess a case). At the preliminary hearing, Davis testified
that Clark "wandered" through the store. R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04. But, at trial, Davis
testified that Clark's movements were deliberate-she walked "straight down" the home
improvement aisle to the Command hooks area, "quickly walked" to and from the
seasonal department, and headed "straight for the exit." R.174:77-81, 91, 95-100, 103-04.
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When confronted with her inconsistent testimony, Davis claimed that she "misspoke" at
the preliminary hearing. R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04, 111-13.
Indeed, the record suggests that the jury continued to consider Larsen's version of
the events despite the State's attempts to discredit her. After the State cross-examined
Larsen, the jury asked two additional questions of Larsen. First, it asked Larsen why she
would "knowingly cash a forged check for someone else." R.174: 156. Larsen responded
that she "didn't know it was forged until [she] cashed it." R.174:156. The jury followed
up with a second question: "[I]f someone else's payroll was not intended for you, ... why
would you then spend the cash that you received from that check?" R.174: 156. Larsen
responded that she spent the money because "I thought, ooh, money, you know, and I
spent it. So that's why I pied guilty." R.174: 156. After Davis's rebuttal testimony the jury
asked yet another question related to Larsen's credibility. R.17 4: 165. The jury asked
Davis if the surveillance video showed whether there was a dog in Larsen's vehicle,
apparently to assess whether Larsen had been telling the truth about entering the store
after Clark because she was settling her dog in the car. Compare R.174: 128; with
R.174: 165. Davis was unable to answer the question, saying it was too dark outside to tell
whether there was a dog in the vehicle. R.174: 165.
State's Exhibit 2, however, unfairly undermined Larsen's credibility. The exhibit
was an official-looking, highly persuasive piece of evidence. See R.175. The Information
was signed by a police officer under oath that the information contained therein was "true
and correct to the best of my belief and knowledge." Id. It was authorized by the Deputy
District Attorney. See id. And it was accompanied by an Arrest Warrant signed by a
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magistrate judge. See id. As explained above, State's Exhibit 2 unfairly undermined
Larsen's credibility by painting her as a dishonest person that even the magistrate
distrusted. It also created an unfair danger that the jury would return a guilty verdict
based on a finding of guilt by association. See supra Part LB.
Moreover, the court did not give the jury a limiting instruction. R.174. Even when
contradiction evidence is admissible, a trial court should admonish the jury to consider
the evidence "only as it may bear on the ... credibility of the testimony." State v. Green,
578 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1978); see State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396,,I27, 101 P.3d 846.
In State v. Washington, therefore, our supreme court upheld the admission of
contradiction evidence because the evidence was admissible and the trial court provided a
limiting instruction. 476 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1970). During direct examination,
"defendant denied having possession of the [stolen] property or knowledge that the same
had been stolen." Id. at 1020. On cross-examination, the trial court permitted the State to
impeach defendant's testimony with evidence that he possessed and used credit cards
stolen at the same time as the charged items. Id. Where the trial court instructed the jury
that the evidence was admitted "solely for the purpose of impeachment of the defendant
and not to in any way prove or tend to prove the defendant's guilt of the charge," our
supreme court held that there was "no prejudicial error in the action of the court." Id. at
1021; see also Levin, 2004 UT App 396,,I,I24-26 (affirming admission of contradiction
evidence where the evidence was admissible for impeachment and the trial court
provided a limiting instruction); Green, 578 P.2d at 513 (same).
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By contrast, in this case, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible and the trial court did
not give a limiting instruction. R.174. This failure left the jury free to consider State's
Exhibit 2 in whatever way it saw fit, including as evidence of Larsen's bad character and
as evidence that Clark was guilty by association. Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood
that but for the erroneous admission of State's Exhibit 2 the jury would have acquitted.

G.

This Issue Is Preserved or It Should Be Addressed for Plain Error.

Clark preserved her argument that admitting State's Exhibit 2 violated rules 402
and 403, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. Alternatively, this Court should
reverse for plain error. Clark did not preserve her argument that State's Exhibit 2 was
inadmissible under rules 901 and 902, but that issue should be reversed for plain error.

1.

Clark Preserved Her Claims that State's Exhibit 2 Violated Rules 402 and
403, the Hearsay Rules, and the Confrontation Clause.

The "preservation requirement is self-imposed and is therefore one of prudence
rather than jurisdiction." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,,rl3, 266 P.3d 828. It
"serve[s] two important policies"-efficiency and fairness. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74,,rl 1, 10 P.3d 346. "[R]equiring a party to raise an issue or argument in the trial court
gives the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate,
correct it," which "avoid[s] unnecessary appeals and retrials." Patterson, 2011 UT
68,ifl5. To preserve an issue for appeal, "counsel must raise the issue in the trial court 'in
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."' State v. Bird,
2015 UT 7,,rl0, 345 P.3d 1141. An appellate court will "look to three factors to
determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: (1) whether the issue was
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raised in a timely fashion, (2) whether it was raised specifically, (3) and whether the party
'introduce[ d] supporting evidence or relevant legal authority."' Id.
But the preservation requirement imposes "no obligation to 'preserve' ... citation
to legal authority" or to fully flesh out the issue. Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63,i{20, 289
P .3d 4 79. Once "the foundation of a claim or argument is presented in a manner that
allows the district court to rule on it, a party challenging the lower court's resolution of
that matter is free to marshal any legal authority that may be relevant to its consideration
on appeal." Id.; see In re Adoption ofJ.MS., 2015 UT 35,i{9, 345 P.3d 709 (statutory and
constitutional arguments preserved even though arguments below "were relatively
superficial" because "the statutory and constitutional aspects of [the] case were presented
to the district court"); Patterson, 2011 UT 68,,Il8 (appellate courts "routinely consider
new authority relevant to issues that have properly been preserved").
Nor does preservation "tum on the use of magic words or phrases." In re Baby

Girl T., 2012 UT 78,,I38, 298 P.3d 1251. An issue will be deemed preserved even if it
was raised indirectly so long as it was "raised to a level of consciousness such that the
trial judge [could] consider it."' Id. i{34. Thus, in Baby Girl T., our supreme court held
that the due process issue was preserved even though appellant "failed to expressly
articulate the due process clause as the basis of his constitutional claim" because "the
record clearly demonstrate[d] his argument was founded in the due process clause." Id.
,I33; see, e.g., State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228,,Il 0, 164 P.3d 1264 (State's argument
relying on Franks doctrine was preserved even though "the State did not formally cite the

Franks case below" because it "argued the underlying premise of the Franks doctrine"
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and this Court had "no doubt the trial court was on notice of the State's legal argument");

Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270,272 (Utah 1992) (although "[defendant's]
objections were not textbook examples of specificity," they nonetheless "adequately
directed the trial judge's attention to the claimed error" such that "they were sufficient").
When deciding whether an issue is preserved, the appellate court will consider the
context of the objection. See Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,iJ26. In Gonzalez, therefore, our
supreme court held that the issue was preserved even though the objection did not
specifically raise the issue because the "specific ground for [the] objection [wa]s clear
from" the context of the trial. Id. Likewise, in Baird v. Baird, our supreme court held that
the issue was preserved even though appellant did not specifically raise the issue because
"the district court necessarily had to consider" the issue as part of its decision to enter the
stalking injunction. 2014 UT 8,iJiJ18-20, 322 P.3d 728.
The appellate court will also consider the circumstances in which the objection
was made. See Bird, 2015 UT 7,iJl l. Thus, in Bird, our supreme court held that the issue
was preserved even though "defense counsel did not introduce relevant legal authority"
because the issue came up at trial and "counsel was given only a brief moment to review
the ... instructions and make her objection." 2015 UT 7,iJiJ4, 11.
Here, Clark preserved her claims regarding rules 402 and 403, the hearsay rules,
and the Confrontation Clause. Regarding rule 402, Clark argues that State's Exhibit 2
was irrelevant for the stated purpose of impeachment because it did not impeach Larsen's
testimony and, even if it did, it was impeachment on an irrelevant and collateral matter.
Regarding rule 403, Clark argues that even if State's Exhibit 2 contained some scant
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probative value for impeachment it was still inadmissible because the probative value, if
any, was limited to the portion of the Information's caption that listed Larsen and Hale as
co-defendants and was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury created by the remainder of the exhibit.
Finally, regarding the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause, Clark argues that
State's Exhibit 2 was created with an eye toward prosecution and, as such, constituted
testimonial hearsay that violated the hearsay rules and the right to confrontation.
These issues are preserved because Clark raised a timely, specific objection and
identified relevant legal authority. Bird, 2015 UT 7,,IIO. First, Clark's objection to State's
Exhibit 2 was timely because she objected at the first opportunity and before the exhibit
was admitted into evidence, thus giving "the court 'an opportunity to address [the]
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it."' Holgate, 2000 UT 74,,Il 1; see R.174: 150.
Second, Clark's objection was specific and identified relevant legal authority.
Clark objected to State's Exhibit 2 below for the same reasons she now raises on appeal.
Clark objected to the exhibit's relevancy because (1) the exhibit did not impeach Larsen
because Larsen "is not an attorney. She doesn't know how court dockets work, how
people are charged"; and (2) the proposed line of impeachment was irrelevant because
"whether [Larsen and Hale] were charged together" was not "relevant here." R.174:150.
Clark objected to the exhibit's admissibility even if it contained some probative value for
impeachment because it was "not just going to whether [Larsen and Hale] were charged
together." R.174: 150. And Clark objected to the hearsay nature of the exhibit by arguing
that "an Information is allegations not a conviction." R.174:150.
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Clark did not specifically cite rules 402 and 403, the hearsay rules, or the
Confrontation Clause, but such specific references were not necessary. As explained
above, Clark was under "no obligation to 'preserve' ... citation to legal authority" or to
fully flesh out the issue. Torian, 2012 UT 63,iJ20. Her objection raised the issues "to a
level of consciousness such that the trial judge [could] consider [them]."' Baby Girl T.,
2012 UT 78,iJ34. Moreover, she made her objection during the heat of trial when she had
"only a brief moment to review" the exhibit "and make her objection." Bird, 2015 UT
7,iJiJ4, 11. Thus, as in Bird, Gonzalez, Baby Girl T, Garcia, and Nielsen, Clark's objection
was adequate to preserve Clark's claims that admitting State's Exhibit 2 violated rules
402 and 403, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause.

2.

Alternatively, this Court Should Review the Issues for Plain Error.

If this Court concludes that any portion of Clark's argument is not preserved, this
Court should reverse because admitting State's Exhibit 2 into evidence was plain error.
"The plain error doctrine is an exception to the general rule of preservation-its 'purpose
is to permit [the appellate court] to avoid injustice."' Jones, 2015 UT 19,iJ49. To show
plain error, a defendant must "establish that: '(i) [an] error exists; (ii) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant."' Id.
In this case, as explained above, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
State's Exhibit 2. See supra Parts I.A.-1.E. Moreover, for the reasons stated above, the
error was harmful. See supra Part I.F. Finally, as explained below, the error should have
been obvious to the trial court. "When a jury hears a case, the court is required to conduct
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the trial 'so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means."' In re
N.A.D., 2014 UT App 249,iJS, 338 P.3d 226 (quoting Utah R.Evid. 103(d)).
In this case, it should have been obvious to the trial court that State's Exhibit 2
was inadmissible under rule 402. It is well-settled that "[i]rrelevant evidence is not
admissible," Utah R.Evid. 402, and that evidence is irrelevant if it '"has no probative
value to a fact at issue."' Smedley, 2003 UT App 79,iJ15; see Utah R.Evid. 401. In
particular, it is well-settled that evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment is not
relevant unless it casts doubt on the witness's credibility. See, e.g., Finlayson, 956 P.2d at
291; Stewart, 925 P.2d at 600. As well, it is well-settled that evidence offered to
contradict a statement made by the witness during cross-examination is not admissible if
it is irrelevant or collateral. See, e.g., Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Indeed, the collateral
rule is "fundamental" and predates the rules of evidence. Warledo, 557 F.2d at 725.
It should also have been obvious to the trial court that State's Exhibit 2 was
inadmissible under rule 403. It is well-settled that evidence is inadmissible "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury." Utah R.Evid. 403. lt is
also well-settled that evidence is unfairly prejudicial if "'it has a tendency to influence the
outcome of the trial by improper means."' Toki, 2011 UT App 293, iJ44 (citing State v.

Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct.App. 1992)). Finally, it is well-settled that a trial court
applying the rule 403 analysis should balance the probative value of the evidence against
its prejudicial effect to ensure that matters of '"scant"' probative force are not "'dragged
in by the heels for the sake of [their] prejudicial effect."' Bartley, 784 P .2d at 123 7.
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In this case, the trial court heard Larsen testify and saw State's Exhibit 2. It should
have been obvious to the court that State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant for the stated purpose
of impeachment because it did not impeach Larsen's testimony and, even if it did, it was
impeachment on an irrelevant and collateral matter. Additionally, it should have been
obvious to the court that even if State's Exhibit 2 contained some scant probative value
for impeachment it was still inadmissible because the probative value, if any, was limited
to the portion of the Information's caption that listed Larsen and Hale as co-defendants
and was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
or misleading the jury created by the remainder of the exhibit.
Additionally, it should have been obvious to the trial court that State's Exhibit 2
was inadmissible under rules 901 and 902, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation
Clause. It is well-settled that "any document, to be received in evidence, must be
authenticated." Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346; see, e.g., Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549-51;
Long, 721 P.2d at 485-86; Utah R.Evid. 901, 902. It is well-settled that hearsay is
inadmissible unless it qualifies for an exception to the rule against hearsay. See Utah
R.Evid. 801-802. The qualifications for the hearsay exceptions are also well-settled. See
Utah R.Evid. 803-804, 807. Moreover, it is well-settled that items like police reports are
inadmissible when offered by the prosecution. See, e.g., Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185-86;
Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,,r27; Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1297-98; Morrell, 803
P.2d at 298. Additionally, it is well-settled that testimonial statements are not admissible
unless the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity to crossexamine. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54; George, 2008 UT App 257,,r8. Finally,
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it is well-settled that statements are testimonial when "'a reasonable person ... would
objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of
a crime."' Williams,

2005 UT App 493,ill 7; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.

Indeed, the error should have been particularly obvious because defense counsel
objected to the evidence and explained why the evidence was inadmissible. R.174:150.
Thus, even if any portion of Clark's argument is not preserved, this Court should reverse
because admitting State's Exhibit 2 constituted plain error.

CONCLUSION
Clark asks this Court to reverse the conviction for Retail Theft and remand for a
new trial.
SUBMITTED this

21_ day of May, 2015.
~

s.~~

LORI J. SEPPI

Attorney for Appellant
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Addendum A

Tab A

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tJTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES

vs.

Case No: 131401488 PS
Judge:
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Date:
September 29, 2014

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

DEBBRA JO CLARK,

Defendant.
custody: Salt Lake County Jail
PRESENT

loriaw
Prosecutor! LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHESNUT, HEATHER J
Clerk:

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 31, 1960
Sheriff Office#: 220472

Audio

Tape Number:

37

Tape Count: 9.55-10.13

CHARGES
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING.) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition~ 08/27/2014 Guilty
2. CRIMINAL TRESPASS KNOWING ENTRY UNLAWFUL - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty "Disposition: 08/27/2014 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT {SHOPLIPT'ING) a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah state Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL TRESPASS KNOWING
ENTRY UNLAWFUL a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is
180 day(s).
Credit is granted for 121 day(e) previously served.

Printed: 10/01/14 14:24:30

Pagel

case No: 131401488 Date:

Sep 29, 2014

SENTENCE FINE
Charge# l
Fine: $5000.00
Suspended: $4750.00
Surcha.rge: $135. 79
Oue: $250.00

Charge#

2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge~
Due:

Tot-al Fine:
Total suspended:
Total surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$1000.00
$750.00
$135.79
$250.00

iCv

I

$6000.00
$S500.00
$271.58
$500.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Pay a fine in the amount of $500.00 Rate to be determined by ap&p.
Attorney Fees
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of~ SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole~
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation.
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.

Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS

No other violations.
Repor·t to AP&P within 24 hours of release from jail..
Enter into and complete any treatment recounnended by AP&P.
Notify the court of any address change.
Timely payments on all fines, attorney fees and restitution.
Dollar for dollar credit towards the fine for treatment expenses
excluding urinalysis charges.
Not to possess or consume alcohol or non prescribed contol
substances.
Random urinalysis and drug testing as requested.
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent.
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or
alcohol are sold.
Enroll and complete CA.TS P.rogram and aftercare~
Court will consider early release upon successful completion of
CATS.
Obtain High School diploma or GED.
Printed: 10/01/14 14:24:30
Page 2
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Case No: 131401488 Date:

Sep 29, 2014

Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education.
$for$ credit towards any education.
No contact with Debbie Larsen
This is a ZERO TOLERANCE probation
Pay attorney fees in the amount for
by ap&p.
Date:

1()

Printed: 10/01/14 14:24:30
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Tab B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LA.KE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

) Case No. 131401488
)

vs.

) Transcript of:
)

DEBBRA JO CLARK,

) JURY TRIAL

__________

)
)
)

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN

WEST JORDAN COURTHOUSE
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84088

AUGUST 27, 2014

TRANSCRIBED BY:

BRAD YOUNG

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 18 2014

1

* * *

2

(State's Exhibit 1 was received into evidence.)

3

* * *

MR. LOPRESTO:

4

5

Please.

THE COURT:

7

:MR. LOPRESTO:

THE COURT:

All right.

The State has rested.

today?

MS. CHESNUT:

12

Yes, your Honor.

The Defense would

call Debbie Clark -- or, pardon me, Debbie Larsen.
THE COURT:

14

15

The State

Ms. Chesnut, do you anticipate calling any witnesses

10

13

Thank you, your Honor.

rests.

9

11

If I could mark that, your

Honor.

6

8

Thank you.

Ms. Larsen, why don't you come forward

and be sworn.

16

(The witness was sworn.)

17

THE COURT:

Just have a seat.

18

* * *

19

DEBBIE LARSEN,

20

called as a witness by the Defendant, having been duly sworn,

21

was examined and testified as follows:

22

*

23
24

25

* *

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS . CHESNUT:

Q.

Ms. Larsen, will you state your full name and spell
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1

your last name for the record?

2

A.

Debbie Larsen, L-a-r-s-e-n.

3

Q.

And, um, do you know a person Debbra Clark?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And do you see her in the courtroom?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And where is she?

8

A.

Right there.

9

Q.

Sitting at the Defense counsel table?

10

A.

Yeah.
THE COURT:

11

12

The record will reflect the

identification by Ms. Larsen of Ms. Clark.

13

Q.

And how do you know her?

14

A.

I've known her for about five years.

15

16
17

She has been a

friend for quite awhile.

Q.

Okay.

Now, do you remember going to a Smith's store

with her back on November 30th of last year?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

No, just my dog.

21

Q.

How did you get to the store?

22

A.

Drive.

23

Q.

Whose car?

24

A.

Mine.

25

Q.

Did you drive?

Now, was anyone else with the two of you?
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1

A.

I drove, yeah.

2

Q.

Now, in your mind, what were the two

3

ot you doing at

the store?

4

A.

We were -- well, I was taking some things, some items

!

5

back that I had purchased, and she was supposed to go get stuff

!"
i

6

for dinner, because we were going to have dinner, and that was

I

7

what we was there for.
Q.

8
9

the store.

A.

10
11

Ar1d

Okay.

Now, you said you were taking things back to

What were you taking back?
Some Mirilax, Fleet and Gas-Ex and then two hooks.
~

I had a receipt for everything but the two hooks.
Okay.

So you had a receipt for the Mirilax and the

12

Q.

13

Gas-Ex?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

What was the other item?

16

A.

Two hooks.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

And Fleet, yeah.

19

Q.

Fleet?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

i

So Mirilax, Gas-Ex and two hooks?

Oh, okay, is that a medication?

So you had a receipt for the medications but

not the hooks?

23

A.

Yeah.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

Yeah.

~

Um, did you purchase the medications?
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Um, on, what is it, 4100 South and Redwood Road.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

No.

6

Q.

Okay.

I was returning them on the one that we went to.

What about the -- the two hooks?

You say you

didn't have a receipt for them?

A.

8
9

Is that the same Smith's store where you were

returning them on November 30th?

5

7

And where did you purchase those?

No, I didn't have a receipt for them.

They were my

boyfriend's, and he never keeps his receipts for anything, and

10

so he told me to take them back, and so I took them back with

11

my stuff, and they came up to me and accused me of having her

12

hand them off to me in the store.

13

Q.

Okay, let's take it one step at a time.

14

A.

Okay.

15

Q.

So you -- you went into the store.

16

Did you go in the

store with Debbra Clark?

17

A.

Yeah -- well, not right with her.

I had to settle my

18

dog and roll the windows down a little, so I was probably three

19

to five minutes behind her.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

What's the first thing you did when you went into the

23

store?

24

25

And did you go into the store?

A.

Turned to the service booth.

It was right inside the

door.
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And what did you do there?

1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I proceeded to return the items.

There was one

3

person ahead of me, so I just waited for them, and then it was

4

my turn, and they were giving me back my money.

5

6

Q.

Okay.

And this was for all five items, the Fleet,

the Mirilax, the Gas-Ex and the two hooks?

7

A.

Yeah.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Why not?

11

A.

Because they came and asked if I knew a Debbie Clark

Did you actually get the money?

12

and if I was with her, and I said yes, and they told me that

13

that not to come in their store ever again, that she was

14

stealing, and I had like items to what she was stealing.

15

Q.

Okay.

Let's talk about the items.

So how -- so

16

these hooks, urn, about -- do you remember about how much you

17

were receiving on a return for them?

18

A.

Like they were like $9 apiece.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

Do you remember the amount on the other three

items, the medications?

21

A.

It was I believe 68.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

Um, is that

was that the total amount you

were receiving back or --

24

A.

Yeah.

25

Q.

-- just for the medications?

129

1

A.

No, they were giving it all back to me.

2

Q.

So you were receiving about $68 back from all of

3

that?

4

A.

Uh-huh.

5

Q.

Okay.

Do you remember what these hooks looked like?

6

A.

Yeah.

They were just white hooks that you stick on

7

your wall and hang things, but they were too thick for my wall.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

The ones that show on TV where they stick to your

10

wall and you don't ruin your wall.

11

Q.

What do you mean they were too thick for your wall?

12

A.

They were too wide, I guess you would say, for my

13

wall, for -- it looked funny with the picture, so I didn't put

14

it up.

15
16

Q.

Okay, now, you said that you were interrupted,

someone came and talked to you about Debbra Clark?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Um, was the return completed ever?

19

A.

It was done to where they -- he had out the money and

20

everything to hand me back, and they was giving me a gift card

21

for the two clamps and had everything ready, and then they came

22

over and asked if I knew her, and they stopped everything and

23

just said -- they didn't give me nothing back.

24

Q.

25

clamps?

You said they were giving you a gift card for the two
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1

2

A.

Yeah.

Because I didn't have a receipt for them.

They was going to give me a Smith's gift card.

3

Q.

Do you mean the hooks?

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

So the same thing?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

Okay.

So, um, now, what happened at that point when

8

they stopped you and talked to you about Debbra?

9

there, go somewhere?

10

A.

We stayed there.

Did you stay

l

I

And they took a picture of me and

11

told me that Debbie Clark was stealing items, and that she

12

passed it off, them hooks off to me in the store.

13

them t<.) go look at their camera, because they would see I

14

didn't even pass her in the store.

15

screaming at me and wouldn't listen to me to go look at he.r.

16

cameras or anything.

And I begged

And the lady started just

17

Q.

What lady was that?

18

A.

She is the blonde lady that was here earlier.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

medications?

21

A.

Um, I took them back to Smith's by where I live.

22

Q.

All five items?

23

A.

Yeah.

24

Q.

So the medications and the hooks?

25

A.

Uh-huh.

And whatever happened to these hooks and

[,

'4/iil
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1

Q.

And did you get a return there?

2

A.

Yeah.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

So they wouldn't complete the return at the

store --

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

-- where you were with Debbie Clark?

7

A.

Nope.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

You said that you asked them to look at

surveillance video?

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

Did you ever see whether they did that?

12

A.

No, I didn't.

13

But I begged them to do that so they

would see that she didn 1 t pass me anything.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

No.

And were you ever charged with anything?
But they told me if I ever went back to Smith's

16

again I would be trespassing.

17

stuff.

18

this lady rationally and tell her hey, but she was hysterical.

I never stole nothing.

And I had a receipt for my
And I was trying to talk to

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

She just, you know, took a picture of me and said

21

never come back here.

22

Q.

23

medications?

24

A.

25

Okay.

Um, what about the receipt you had for these

Yeah, I tried to talk to them about that, too, and

still she was -- she wouldn't Listen to me.
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1

Q.

What happened -- do you still have the receipt?

2

A.

No.

3
4

5

When I -- when I took it back to the other

Smith's I gave them the receipt.
Q.

Okay.

Um, all right.

Did you, urn, ever attempt to

tell this woman or anybody else about where you got these

6 medications or hooks or show them the receipt?
7

8

9

tell them about that?

A:

I told them that I got them on Smith's on 41st, on

4100 South and Redwood.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

And that's -- that's all I told them.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

Um, did you tell them where you got these

hooks?
·G,;

14

A.

What do you mean?

15

Q.

The hooks you were trying to return?

16

A.

Oh, yeah.

17

Did you ever

I just told them my boyfriend don't keep

receipts, and I don't have the receipts for these two items.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

And they said, "That's fine.

Did you

We will give you a gift

20

card for that and we will give you your cash back for the

21

other."

22

Q.

23

Okay.

So you were getting a gift card for the hooks

because you didn't have a receipt?

24

A.

Yeah.

25

Q.

Okay.

Um, did you ever see Debbra Clark, urn, at any
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1
2

point after attempting to make this return that day?
A.

No, I never saw her.

3

MS. CHESNUT:

Okay.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LOPRESTO:

That's all I have.

Mr. Lopresto, cross-examination?
Yes, your Honor.

6

* * *

7

CROSS-EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. LOPRESTO:

9

Q.

Good afternoon, Ms. Larsen.

10

A.

Hi.

11

Q.

Hi.

12

A.

Debbie Larsen.

13

Q.

Is your -- do you go by Debbie Child Larsen?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

Is Child a previous last name of yours?

16

A.

That's my maiden name.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Uh-huh.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

that right?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

Um, what is your full name?

And your birth date is March 8th, 1967?

And you live at 3810 South Redwood Road; is

And so tell me if I'm wrong, but it sounds

like you purchased the items, except for the hooks --

24

A.

Yeah.

25

Q.

--

at the Smith's right down the street from where
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1

you live?

2

A.

Yeah.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Um, but the two hooks, you didn't purchase

those?

5

A.

No.

My boyfriend did.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

No, it's Jeff.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

Yeah -- well, no, he ctictn•t ask me.

And your boyfriend 1 s name is J.D. Cook?

And he asked you to take those back, right?
They didn't work

10

with the pictures that I have, so I took them back, because

11

they were the wrong size for my wall.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Knowles, K-n-o-w-1-e-s.

14

Q.

Um, so he bought the hooks for you, just didn't keep

15

the receipt?

16

A.

He just bought the wrong ones, yeah.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Um, like the week previously before I went to take

19

What's your boyfriend's last name?

And when did he buy those for you?

them back.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

They had been sitting in my car along with the stuff

in the back, and

23

them back yet, so it was probably a couple of weeks, maybe, at

24

the most.

25

Q.

Okay.

I

hadn't --

hadn't got to the store to take

22

I

And so you had them in your car when you went
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1

to go pick up Ms. Clark?

2

A.

Yeah.

3

Q.

Okay.

4
5

And did Ms. Clark tell you that she wanted you

to take her to Smith's?
A.

Yeah -- wel1, no, we just decided we were going to

6

have dinner, and she was going to cook dinner for us, and so we

7

went to Smith's to get stuff for dinner.

8

9

10

Q.

Okay.

So who -- who is the other person?

that Ms. Clark was going to cook dinner for us.

You said

Was that just

you and Ms. Clark or were there other people involved?

11

A.

There was Jeff and -- I think just me and Jeff.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

So were all of you over at your house?

15

A.

My house, yeah.

16

So you and Ms. Clark and Jeff?

But she lived by that Smith's.

That's why we stopped there.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Yeah.

19

Q.

And you were at that location, correct, when

20

So you live at about 3800 South Redwood?

Ms. Clark said she wanted to make dinner for you?

21

A.

We

22

Q.

Where is your house?

23

A.

3810 South.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

Yeah.

were at my house.

And Ms. Clark was there with you?
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And -- okay.

So you drove to the store?

1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Uh-huh.

3

Q.

And the store that you drove to was at 4500 South and

4

~

9th East; is that correct?

5

A.

Yeah.

6

Q.

Okay.

~

But you said that it took you about five

7

minutes or so after Mr. Clark entered the store before you did,

8

right?

9

10

A.

-~Yeah.

I had my dog in the car, so I settled him

down, and then I -- I won't leave him in there for long.

So

11

Q.

But this was in November, right?

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

Was it cold at that point?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

Now, you said that after a couple of minutes, after

That's why I got him settled down and stuff.

16

about five minutes or so you entered the store and went to do

17

this return; is that right?

18

A.

Uh··-huh.

19

Q.

And at some point loss prevention caine up to you,

20

correct?

~-

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And you had been standing there for, what, 10

23

minutes?

~-

24

A.

Ten minutes about.

25

Q.

And, all of a sudden, these people just show up,
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1

correct?

2

A.

Yeah, out of nowhere.

3

Q.

All right.

4

And they -- they asked you if you were

there with Debbra Clark, didn't they?

5

A.

Yeah.

6

Q.

But your testimony is that you said you were there

7

Yeah.

with Debbra Clark?

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

You didn't tell them that you weren't there with

10

Debbra Clark?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

You didn't tell them that you didn't know who Debbra

13

Clark was?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Now, you have known Debbra Clark for a long time,

16

right?

You are good friends?

17

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

20

the record.

21

You need to answer out loud, ma'am.
What?
You were nodding your head.

We are on

The record doesn't reflect the nods.

THE WITNESS:

Okay~

Yes.

22

Q.

You are good friends?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

How often would you say, uh, you get together with

25

Ms. Clark?
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1

A.

Probably once a week.

2

Q.

So once a week for the past five years?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

Sometimes longer, but mostly we see each other once a

6

So that would be --

week.
!
I

Q.

7
8

Do you see each other more frequently than once a

week?
A.

No, not really.

10

Q.

Okay.

So it is generally once a week, sometimes a

little bit more time?

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

Is that right?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

And when you see Ms. Clark, do you see her alone or

16

do you see her with other friends?

17

A.

Um, I see her with one other friend sometimes.

18

Q.

And who is that?

19

A.

Wanda.

20

Which she is my friend too, now.

introduced through Debbie to her.

I was

She is a good lady.

21

Q.

So you never see Ms. Clark with Christian Hale?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

25

Ms.

I.~

~

)

9

11

I

And what is Mr. Hale's relationship to

Clark?
A.

They were boyfriend and girlfriend.
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1
2

Q.

Okay.

And so on these times that you got together

with Ms. Clark was Mr. Hale with you or --

3

MS. CHESNUT:

4

THE COURT:

5
6
7
8

9

Q.

Objection to relevance, your Honor.
Overruled.

So these times that you were together with Mr. Clark,

Mr. Hale is with her?
A.

Sometimes he was with her but not all the time.

He

wasn't there this time.
Q.

Okay.

These times that you have gotten together with

10

Ms. Clark and Mr. Hale, has it been like the same type of

11

scenario, though, like having dinner together, that type of

12

stuff?

13

A.

Yeah, stuff like that.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Yeah.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Yeah.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

girlfriend?

21

25

Do you know about when they were boyfriend and

Your Honor, again, objection to

MS. CHESNUT:

relevance.

23

24

And you know Mr. Hale and Ms. Clark were

boyfriend and girlfriend, right?

18

22

So you know Mr. Hale?

I don't see how this is relevant to the charge.
MR. LOPRESTO:

Your Honor, this is Defendant's

witness.
THE COURT:

I'm going to give a little leeway, but
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1

make it quick.

2
Q.

3

4

Thank you.

MR. LOPRESTO:

Do you know about when Mr. Hale and Ms. Clark were

boyfriend and girlfriend?
I know it had been years, but I don't know how

A.

No.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

It had probably been a month or so before then.

9

Q.

Okay.

5
6

10

many.
When is the last time you had seen Mr. Hale?

And is that the time when you and Mr. Hale

were passing forged checks?

11

MS. CHESNUT:

Objection, your Honor.

12

THE WITNESS:

No, we --

13

THE COURT:

Wait, wait, wait, wait.

Counsel, if

14

there is a 609 issue, I think you simply have to ask her if she

15

has been

16

MR. IDPRESTO:

It's a 608 issue, your Honor.

608

17

specifically allows me to go into the instances of conduct that

18

the defendant -- or that the witness has engaged in, with

19

regards to her truthfulness.

20

THE COURT:

Ms. Chesnut, the rule does say in

21

subsection (b) that the Court may on cross-examination allow

22

them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character

23

for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness.

24
25

MS. CHESNUT:

All right, well, your Honor, I don't

have any information about what Mr. Lopresto is delving in here
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1

to.

2

properly respond.

3
4
5

I would ask to have a chance to examine it so I can

THE COURT:

Do you have evidence of a conviction for

that?

MR. LOPRESTO:

Your Honor, I have an Information and

6

I have a docket from this court that I plan on presenting to

7

Ms. Larsen during cross-examination.

8

Court that the State was only made aware of this witness --

9
10

THE COURT:

I would also remind the

I understand.

MR. I.OPRESTO:

I found out about this information

11

during the lunch hour.

12

would certainly think that Defendant would know about this

13

particular issue.

14
15

THE COURT:

And if this is Defendant's witness, I

I'm going to allow you to proceed under

Rule 608 (b) •

16

MR. LOPRESTO:

17

MS. CHESNUT:

18

Thank you.
Your Honor, I still would like the

chance to examine what he is using.

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. CHESNUT:

I haven't seen that.

Why don't you show Ms. Chesnut.
Well, your Honor, I base -- I object

21

based on that this is -- appears to be a conviction, which is

22

governed by Rule 609, regardless of 608.

23

It is not a -- let's see -- I would argue it's not a crime of

24

truthfulness, without more information, and, um, certainly, I

25

think we would have to have the plea paperwork to see exactly

It is not a felony.
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1

what the plea was to

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. CHESNUT:

Let me see the document.
-- especially if Mr. Lopresto is

4

offering this as a specific instance, which I would -- you

5

know, I think it has to be governed by Rule 609.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LOPRESTO:

8

MS. CHESNUT:

9
10

Um, I'm going to allow you to proceed.
Thank you, your Honor.
Your Honor, I would like to make

further argument for the record as well as a motion for
mistrial.

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. CHESNUT:

Go ahead.
Your Honor, um, to be a little bit more

13

clear, Mr. Lopresto is attempting to enter this under Rule

14

608(b) without regard to Rule 609.

15

the rules have to be read in conjunction with, in harmony with

16

each other.

17

inforrnation about with regard to what exactly specifiG conduct

18

was underlying this plea.

19

was not involved in this case, according to the State's own

20

evidence.

21

basis that it is improper evidence under both Rule 608 and 609,

22

and that, yet, it has been entered without an in limine rnotion.

23

um, as the Court is aware,

Um, this is something that we don't have specific

It also, wn, involves somebody who

And I would also make a motion for a mistrial on the

THE COURT:

Well, Ms. Chesnut, it's your witness.

24

You only gave notice to Mr. Lopresto this morning.

This is a

25

plea to a theft by deception, which in this Court's opinion is
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1

admissible under Rule 609, and Rule 608 specifically indicates

2

that the Court may on cross-examination allow them to be

3

inquired into if they are probative of the character for

4

truthfulness or untruthfulness.

5

proceed.

6

going to require that a certified copy -- is that a certified

7

copy?

8
9

The motion for mistrial is denied.

MR. LOPRESTO:

It isn't, your Honor.

You may

Although, I'm

And again, I

only asked her about her passing bad checks with the
I did not offer into evidence a

10

defendant's boyfriend.

11

certified copy of a conviction.

12

speaking about prior instances of conduct.

13

·...iD

I find that it is.

I was going under 608 and

Moreover, I would ask the Court to take judicial
This is

14

notice of the case number that 1 s being inquired into.

15

something that's available to the Court and I think the Court

16

can divine from its own information that there is a conviction,

17

but because the State only received notice of this witness this

18

morning I didn't have the opportunity to get a certified copy

19

of the conviction.

20

do that before this case is rested.

21

office and ask them to stamp the certified copy of the

22

conviction.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Now, if the Court would allow me, I could
I can go to the clerk's

I'm going to allow you to do that.

That's the proper way to have· it done.
MR. LOPRESTO:

Thank you .
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1

Q.

Now, Ms. Larsen, uh, you pled guilty about five days

2

after this incident at Smith's to forgery as a third-degree

3

felony?

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

And in that case you admitted that your boyfriend was

6

the individual who had been purchasing payroll checks; is that

7

correct?

8

A.

It wasn't my boyfriend that was doing it.

9

Q.

Post-Miranda, you didn't admit to --

10

A.

No, it was J.D. Cook.

11

Q.

Let me please answer -- or ask the question.

12

My boyfriend wasn't it.

A.

14

personally.

15

Q.

17

18
19

20
21

From a

long-time friend J.D. Cook?

13

16

It was J.D. Cook.

Okay.

She gave it to me

And you were charged with the defendant's

boyfriend, Christian Hale?
A.

No, we didn't have -- we weren't charged together.

We never went together.
Q.

I'm going to show you what has been marked State's

Exhibit No. 2.
A.

Yeah.

Do you recognize that document?
There was some mix-up in my court case,

22

because they said that for some reason he is tacked on the end

23

of mine, when we never had trial together, never had court

24

together or nothing at all.

25

Q.

Is Mr. Hale's name on that Information?
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1

1

2

Yes.

A.

But he -- we didn't go to court together or any

of that stuff.

3

Q.

It's because you pled guilty; isn't that right?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

You didn't have trial, did you?

6

A.

No.

I don't know why they didn't

7

they did it like that.

8

him to cash a check.

I have no idea.

MS. CHESNUT:

10

for a correction on the record.

11

convicted of a third-degree felony.

13

But I never went with

I went with J.D. Cook.

9

12

I don't know why

Your Honor, I would like -- I would ask

MR. LOPRESTO:

She is not -- was not

And that's correct, your Honor.

I

apologize.

14

THE WITNESS:

No, I'm not.

15

MR. IDPRESTO:

16

THE COURT:

It was a theft by deception.

I understand.

That was what I said

17

before.

18

Ms. Larsen was not convicted of a third-degree felony forgery.

19

She was convicted of a class

20

as I previously indicated, based upon my review of the docket.

21

Okay?

22
23

Q.

Members of the jury, you are instructed that

A

misdemeanor theft by deception,

So your friend supplied you with payroll checks that

you attempted --

24

A.

No, she made the check.

25

Q.

Okay.

And then you went into Wells Fargo and you
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1
2

3

tried to cash that check?
A.

And I didn't -- yeah, I did not know that check

was ..-- I thought it wa.s regular check .

4

Q.

But you pled guilty to theft by deception?

5

A.

I know.

6

I went to my bank first, and they wouldn't

let me do it, because I didn't have funds in it.

So I went to
I

7

Wells Fargo, she took me to Wells Fargo, and when I got out of

8

Wells Fargo, after putting my fingerprint and my phone number

9

and my name, everything on this check, she told me she had made

i
I

:

t~

10

the check.

11

Q.

So you pled guilty to theft by deception?

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

Theft

14

oy

deception means that you attempt to obtain

property from another by deceiving them; isn't that right?

15

A.

Yeah.

16

Q.

You attempted to get property from Wells Fargo by

17

But I didn't know until after.

deception?

18

A.

After -- after I found out, yes.

19

Q.

And you entered that bank on February 4th, 2013?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

Right?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And the check number that you attempted to cash was

24
25

102548, correct?
A.

I have no idea.
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1
2

Q.

And on February 4th, 2013, Christian Hale also

entered the Wells Fargo Bank and attempted to a cash a check

3

A.

I don't know

4

Q.

-- check No. 102552; isn't that correct?

5

MS. CHESNUT:

Objection to

6

THE WITNESS:

Not with me.

7

THE COURT:

8

Wait, wait, wait.

He asked if she knew

if that was correct, so I will allow her to respond.
THE WITNESS:

9

No, he -- not with me he didn't.

10

don't know.

11

Q.

12

County?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

But a check written on a payroll check from LG

15
16
17
18

19
20

Did you ever work for LG Warehousing in Salt Lake

It's in Davis County.

Warehousing had your name on it, correct?
A.

Yeah.

It was made out to me like a regular check,

like any check you would see.
Q.

And you thought that you could cash a payroll --

payroll check from LG Warehousing?
A.

Yeah.

I thought it was her job, J.D. Cook's job,

21

because she cleans houses and stuff.

22

under.

23

24
25

I

Q.

I didn't know what it was

So it was everybody else lying not you lying?

Is

that what you are trying to say?
A.

No, I'm not saying I'm -- I'm not lying.

I'm just
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1

telling you the truth.

Chris Hale was not in my court papers.

2

He --- we did not go to court together.

3

together, ever; but met through the same person, we got the

4

checks, but I didn't know that it was -- what was going on

5

until after I had cashed that check at Wells Fargo, and they

We never cashed a check

6 were going to charge me with a third-degree felony, and l pled
7

guilty to a misdemeanor.

9

evidence what has been marked as State's Exhibit No. 2.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. LOPRESTO:

12

THE

13

Your Honor, I would like to offer into

MR. LOPRESTO:

8

Is that the docket?
That is the Infonnation, your Honor.
He was never in the courtroom with me

WITNESS:

ever.
THE COURT:

14

I think you are entitled to -- to

15

introduce the conviction.

16

introduce

17

to introduce as an exhibit the conviction for theft by

18

deception, but I'm not going to allow the Information.

19

I don't think you are entitled to

or to admit the Infor.mation.

:MR. IDPRESTO:

So I will allow you

And I would argue, your Honor, the

20

reason why it is being offered is because the witness has

21

stated that Christian Hale was never on her court documents,

22

and the State has --

23

THE WITNESS:

24

MR. LOPRESTO:

25

He

was not.
an Information with Christian

Hale's name on it, with Ms. Larsen's name on it.

The jury
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1

should be entitled to see that documentation .

..J

2

·..d

My probation officer told me they made

THE WITNESS:

3

a mix-up.

We have never been to court together.

4

been hooked together.

5

person.

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. CHESNUT:

We just got a check from the same

What is your position, Ms. Chesnut?
Um, well, obviously, an Information is

And, um, I'm not sure how

8

allegations not a conviction.

9

this -- how allegations is impeachment material.

10

THE COURT:

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

We have never

Were you jointly charged with Mr. Hale?
No .
All right.

I will allow the admission.

13

* * *

14

(State's Exhibit 2 was received into evidence.)

15

* * *

16

MR. LOPRESTO:

17

MS. CHESNOT:

Thank you, your Honor.

And, your Honor, I will object, because

18

it is not just going to whether they were charged together,

19

which, by the way, I don't think is relevant here.

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. CHESNUT:

22

attorney.

23

are charged.

24
25

Well, obviously, she is not an

She doesn't know how court dockets work, how people

THE COURT:

weight.

It impeaches her testimony, Ms. Chesnut.

I'm going to allow it.

You can argue the

You may publish.
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1

MR. LOPRESTO:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

Thank you.
And just because I did that don't mean

I'm not an honest person.

4

THE COURT:

5

Do you have any redirect?

6

MS. CHESNUT:

7

THE COURT:

There is no question for you, ma'am.

Yeah.
Go ahead.
.<w

8

* * *

9

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

10

BY MS. CHESNUT:

Q.

11

12

Okay, Ms. Larsen, now, the Prosecution has talked to

you about a conviction that you had earlier this year.

13

A.

Uh-huh.

14

Q.

And that was for a class A theft by deception; is

15

that right?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

So you were not convicted of the forgery count, were

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Okay.

18

21

you?

Now, urn, the Prosecution has also talked to

you about a person Christian Hale.

22

A.

Yeah.

23

Q.

Now -- and has talked to you about whether you were

24

25

involved in this with him; is that right?
A.

Not with him but just involved in the circle -- there
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1

was a circle of people, and they showed me pictures and asked

2

me who I knew and who I didn't.

3
4

Q.

Okay.

It was a detective.

And, um, was that on this theft by deception

count that you have been talking about?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

But why they run me and him together, I don't know.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

Now, um --

Did, um -- did you know that he received a

check as well?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

When did you find that out?

12

A.

Um, after I cashed mine.

13

Q.

After you cashed yours?

14

A.

Uh-huh.

15

Q.

But not before?

16

A.

Probably like a day later or so.

17

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Okay.

22

I hadn't

seen him at all.

18

21

Huh-uh.

But you didn't know before?

This person you got the check from, how did

you know her?
A.

I

had known her for two years.

She was my

I

thought she was

23

great.

one of my best friends.

She helped me

24

pack my house when I had some problems and needed to move.

25

she -- she was a great person.

And

And she called me up to cash a
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1

check for her, because she lost her ID, and I heard someone, a

2

man in the background telling -- saying, um, well, we can just

3

put it in her name, because it's

4

her to cash that way.

5

my name.

6

that was not a real check.

7

real phone number, but I -- I was looking at a third-degree

8

felony.

9

get a felony charge.

you know, it's easier for

So they -- I said okay.

And I went and cashed it.

They put it in

I honestly did not know

I mean I put my real name, I put my

I pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor before I could

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

And just because this happened, it -- it ctoesn't mean

12
13
14

Okay.

I'm a liar, I'm not telling the truth today.
Q.

Does any of that circumstance with the check have

anything to do with this case we are talking about today?

15

A.

Nothing.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

Um, is anyone who was involved with that check

involved in this case?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Um, was any of the -- did you receive any money from

20

that check from that case --

21

A.

Yes, she did give me some money afterwards.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

I spent it.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

And what happened to that?

Is any of that money involved in this case

today?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Um, okay, now, you say you have been friends

with Debbie Clark, who is here today?

4

A.

Uh-huh.

5

Q.

Now, would you come into court and lie for her about

6

something?

7

A.

No, I would not.

8

Q.

Why wouldn't you do that?

9

A.

Because it's not right.

10

to what

11

They should own their own, you know, problems or whatever.

12

I would never lie for her.

13
14

Q.

I

did, and

I

It '.s -- I'm -- I can admit

expect everyone else to be the same way.

And is that why you pled to that check is because you

did go cash it?

15

A.

Yeah, I did cash it.

16

Q.

So you took responsibility for that?

17

A.

Yeah.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

But

So, um, so are you saying you would expect

Debbra Clark to do the same thing?

20

A.

Yeah, if she had done this, yes.

21

Q.

So, again, expecting that, would you come into court

22

23

and lie for her?
A.

No.

24

MS. CHESNUT:

25

THE COURT:

I have no further questions.
Any redirect?
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1

MR. IDPRESTO:

2

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Any questions from the jury for

3

Ms. Larsen?

4

hand it to my bailiff, and I will review it with counsel.

All right, write it down on a piece of paper and

5

JUROR:

6

THE COURT:

It will take a second to write it down.
Oh, you are fine.

Take your time.

While

7 we are waiting for that to be done, um, there was an indication
8

that the State was going to introduce a certified copy of the

9

conviction for theft by deception.

Um, is that the State's

10

intention, or do you want to stipulate that that is a fact?

11

It's up to you.

12

MS. CHESNUT:

13

THE COURT:

14

The docket, you mean?
Well, the judgment, commitment, whatever

is in the court's file.

15

MS. CHESNUT:

16

THE COURT:

Well, I think she has admitted it.
So

you are willing to -- to waive the

17

actual judgment and conviction and will stipulate that she was

18

convicted of a class A misdemeanor theft by deception?

19

MS. CHESNUT:

20

THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

So, members of the jury, we

21

are not going to introduce a certified copy of the judgment

22

wherein Ms. Larsen was convicted of theft by deception.

23

State -- or the Defense has indicated that they will stipulate

24

that is a fact without taking the time to go down to the

25

clerk's off.ice and have a certified copy of that conviction.

The
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1

So you can take that as evidence in the case.
All right, counsel, please approach.

2

3

(A discussion at the bench.)

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. CHESNUT:

6

I haven't seen this.

MR. LOPRESTO:

8

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Okay.

(Proceedings held in open court.)
THE COURT:

10

All right.

Ms. Larsen, why would you

knowingly cash a forged check for someone else?
I didn't know it was forged until I

THE WITNESS:

12

13

I don't have a

problem with that.

9

cashed it.

14

....;)

Do you have a problem?

7

11

Okay?

THE COURT:

The second question, if someone else's

15

payroll was not intended for you, why would -- why would you

16

then spend the cash that you received from that check?
Because she told me after I cashed the

THE WITNESS:

17
18

check that it was a check she had made, and I thought, ooh,

19

money, you know, and I spent it.

So that's why I pled guilty.

All right.

'Any other questions from the

20
21

THE COURT:

jury?

Any follow-up questions from counsel?

22

MR. I.OPRESTO:

23

MS. CHESNUT:

24

THE COURT:

25

No,

your Honor.

No, your Honor.
All right.

You may step down.

Thank

you, Ms. Larsen.
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Tab C

Utah R. Evid. 401
Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence

Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be withoµt
the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence ( 1971 }, but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a
tendency to prove or disprove the existence of any ''material fact." Avoiding the use of
the tenn "material fact" accords with the application given to former Rule 1(2) by the
Utah Supreme Court. State v. Peterson, 560 P .2d 13 87 (Utah 1977).

Utah R. Evid. 402
Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence

Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise~
•
•
•
•

the United States Constitution;
the Utah Constitution;
a statute; or
rules applicable in courts of this state.

Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi9ence (1974) except that prior to
the word "statute" the words "Constitution of the United States" have been added.

:~

Utah R. Evid. 403
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or
Other Reasons

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY CO:MMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah
Rules of Evidence ( 1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of
relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would
be within the concept of 11 unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances
would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle,
445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. ·rex. 1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case
ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns,
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiserv. Lobner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

,_;,;

Utah R. Evid. 611
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence
(a)
Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise reasonable control over
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
( 1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth;
(2) avoid wasting time; and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b)
Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility. The court
may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on direct examination
except as necessary to develop the witness's testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow
leading questions:
(I) on cross-examination; and

(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and restates the inherent power of the court to
control the judicial process. Cf. Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210, 461 P .2d 56
( 1969). There was no comparable provision to Subsection (b) in Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), but it is comparable to current Utah case law and practice. Degnan, Non-Rules
Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6 Utah L. Rev. 323 (1959). Subsection (c) is
comparable to current Utah practice. Cf. Rule 43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

·c;

Utah R. Evid. 801
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay
(a)
Statement. "Statement" means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.
(b)

Declarant. "Declarant" means the person who made the statement.

(c)

Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and

(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
(d)
Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following
conditions is not hearsay:

(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies having made
the statement or has forgotten, or

(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or

implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.
(2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an opposing party

and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;
( C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the

subject;
(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope.of that
relationship and while it existed; or

(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subsection (a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices and machines, e.g., radar. The definition
of "hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (d)(l) is similar to Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates
from the federal rule in that it allows use of prior statements as substantive evidence if ( 1)
inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and does not require the prior statement to
have been given under oath or subject to perjury. The former Utah rules admitted such
statements as an exception to the hearsay rule. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
( 1970), with respect to confrontation problems under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Subdivision (d)(l) is as originally promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and the actual effect
on most juries.
Subdivision (d)(l)(B) is in substance the same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its interpretation of the applicable rule in this
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310 P.2d 388 (1957).
Subdivision (d)(l)(C) comports with prior Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d
123,388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277,451 P.2d 786 (1969).
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971 ), as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B) and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was of similar substance and scope to
subdivision (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required that the declarant be unavailable

c-·,
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before such admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious admissions have been
recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d
1161 (Utah 1980).
Statements by a coconspirator of a party made during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay under subdivision ( d)(2)(E), have traditionally
been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d
285 (1941). Rule 63(9)(b), l)tah Rules of Evidence (1971), was broader than this rule in
that it provided for the admission of statements made while the party and declarant were
participating in a plan to commit a crime or a civil wrong if the statement was relevant to
the plan or its subject matter and made while the plan was in existence and before its
complete execution or other termination.

Utah R. Evid. 802

I

·~

!n
!

Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

j
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974), and is the same as the
first paragraph of Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).

i

U tab R. Evid. 803
Rule 803. Exceptions to tbe Rule Against Hearsay Declarant Is Available as a Witness

Regardless of Whether the

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness:
( 1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the
declarant' s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional,
sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will.

(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that:
(A) is made for - and is reasonably pertinent to - medical diagnosis or treatment; and
(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception;

or their general cause.
(5) Recorded Recollection. A record that:

(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to
testify fully and accurately;
(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's
memory; and

(C) accurately reflects the witness's knowledge.
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only
if offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition,
opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by - or from information transmitted by
- someone with l01owledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified
witness, or by a certification that complies with Ru]e 902( 11) or ( 12) or with a statute
pennitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
(7) Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Evidence that a matter is
not included in a record described in paragraph (6) if:

(A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist;
(B) a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and
(C) neither the possible source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a

lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if:
(A) it sets out:
(i)

the office's activities;

(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal
case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or

(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a
legally authorized investigation; and
(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Public Records of Vital Statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported
to a public office in accordance with a legal duty.

r:-:
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( 10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony - or a certification under Rule 902 - that
a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if the testimony or
certification is admitted to prove that:
(A) the record or statement does not exist; or
(B) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement
for a matter of that kind.

(11) Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or Family History. A
statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or
marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A statement of fact
contained in a certificate:

(A) made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform
the act certified;
(B) attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered

a sacrament; and
(C) purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
after it.
(13) Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a
family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a
portrait, or engraving on an urn or b~rial marker.
( 14) Records of Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. The record of a document
that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if:
(A) the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along
with its signing and its delivery by each person who purports to have signed it;
(B) the record is kept in a public office; and

(C) a statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office.
( 15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A statement contained
in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter

stated was relevant to the document's purpose - unless later dealings with the property
are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
( 16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that is at least 20

years old and whose authenticity is established.
( 17) Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. Market quotations, lists,
directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons
in particular occupations.
( 18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement contained in

a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or

relied on by the expert on direct examination; and
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or
testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice.
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. A reputation among a person's

family by blood, adoption, or marriage - or among a person's associates or in the
community- conceming the person's birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage,
divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal
or family history.
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. A reputation in a community
- arising before the controversy - concerning boundaries of land in the community or
customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to that
community, state, or nation.

(21) Reputation Concerning Character. A reputation among a person's associates or in
the community concerning the person's character.
(22) Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if:
r,

(A) the judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea;
(B) the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more
than a year;

(C) the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment; and

~

(D) when offered by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other than
impeachment, the judgment was against the defendant.
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History or a Boundary. A
judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or
boundaries, if the matter:
(A) was essential to the judgment; and
(B) could be proved by evidence of reputation.

(24) [Other exceptions.] [Transferred to Rule 807 .]
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes made to
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective December 1, 2000.

Utab R. Evid. 804
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay - When the Declarant is
Unavailable as a Witness

(a)
Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a
witness if the declarant:
(I) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's statement
because the com1 rules that a privilege applies;
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so;
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter;

(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing
infirmity, physical illness, or mental iJlness; or
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able,
by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance.
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or
wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the
declarant from attending or testifying.
(b)
The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during
the current proceeding or a different one; and

(B) is now offered against a party who had - or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in
interest had - an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or
redirect examination.
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant' s death to be imminent, if
the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that:

(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person
believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declaranes
proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's
claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that c1early indicate its trustworthiness,
if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal
liability.

(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about:
(A) the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce,
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, even
though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that fact; or

' "'

(B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the declarant was
related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with
the person's family that the declarant's infonnation is likely to be accurate.

2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule
62(7)[(e)], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be encompassed in Rule 804(a)(5).
Subdivision (a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which permits judicial discretion
to be applied in determining unavailability of a witness.
Subdivision (b)(l) is comparable to Rule 63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the
former rule is broader to the extent that it did not limit the admission of the testimony to a
situation where the party to the action had the interest and opportunity to develop the
testimony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537
(Utah 1981 ).
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the
former rule was not limited to declarations concerning the cause or circumstances of the
impending death nor did it limit dying declarations in criminal prosecutions to homicide
cases. The rule has been modified by making it applicable to any civil or criminal

proceeding, subject to the qualification that the judge finds the statement to have been
made in good faith.
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), though
it does not extend merely to social interests.
Subdivision (b)(4) is similar to Rule 63(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (b)(5) had no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).

Utah R. Evid. 807
Rule 807. Residual Exception
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.

(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the
proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and
its particulars, including the declarant' s name and address, so that the party has a fair
opportunity to meet it.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule
807 to reflect the organization found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. No substantive
change is intended. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
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Utah R. Evid. 901
Rule 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence
(a)
In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.
Examples. The following are examples only- not a complete list - of evidence
that satisfies the requirement:
(b)

(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is
claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion About Handwriting. A nonexpert's opinion that handwriting is

genuine, based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation.
(3) Comparison by an Expe1i Witness or the Trier of Fact. A comparison with an
authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact.
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all
the circumstances.
(5) Opinion About a Voice. An opinion identifying a person's voice-whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording - based on
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged
speaker.
(6) Evidence About a Telephone Conversation. For a telephone conversation, evidence
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time to:
(A) a particular person, if circumstances, including self-identification, show that the
person answering was the one called; or
(B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call related to
business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) Evidence About Public Records. Evidence that:
(A) a document was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law; or

I
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(B) a purported public record or statement is from the office where items of this kind are
kept.
(8) Evidence About Ancient Documents or Data Compilations. For a document or data

compilation, evidence that it:
(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity;

(B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and
(C) is at least 20 years old when offered.

(9) Evidence About a Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system and
showing that it produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or
identification allowed by court rule or statute of this state.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
st-yle and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
st-ylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subdivision (b)(2) is in accord with State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447 (1906).
Subdivision (b)(8) is comparable with Rule 67, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), except
that the former rule imposed a 30-year requirement. Subdivision (b)( 10) is an adaptation
of subdivision (10) in the comparable federal rules to conform to state practice.

Utah R. Evid. 902
Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating
The following items of evidence are se]f-authenticating; they require no extrinsic
evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:
(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed. A document that bears:

(A) a seal purp011ing to be that of the United States; any state, district, commonwealth,
territory, or insular possession of the United States; the former Panama Canal Zone; the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; a political subdivision of any of these entities; or a
department, agency, or officer of any entity named above; and
(B) a signature purporting to be an execution or attestation.

(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed But Are Signed and Certified. A
document that bears no seal if:
(A) it bears the signature of an officer or employee of an entity named in Rule
902( 1)(A); and

(B) another public officer who has a seal and official duties within that same entity
certifies under seal - or its equivalent - that the signer has the official capacity and that
the signature is genuine.
(3) Foreign Public Documents. A document that purports to be signed or attested by a
person who is authorized by a foreign country's law to do so. The document must be
accompanied by a final certification that certifies the genuineness of the signature and
official position of the signer or attester - or of any foreign official whose certificate of
genuineness relates to the signature or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of
genuineness relating to the signature or attestation. The certification may be made by a
secretary of a United States embassy or legation; by a consul general, vice consul, or
consular agent of the United States; or by a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign
country assigned or accredited to the United States. If all parties have been given a
reasonable opportunity to investigate the document's authenticity and accuracy, the court
may, for good cause, either:
(A) order that it be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification; or
(B) allow it to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification.

[\
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(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official record - or a copy of a
document that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law - if the copy
is certified as correct by:
(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification; or
(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of the United
States or of this state.
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlet, or other publication purporting to be issued
by public authority.
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. Printed material purporting to be a newspaper or

periodical.
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. An inscription, sign, tag, or label purporting to have
been affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control.
(8) Acknowledged Documents. A document accompanied by a certificate of
acknowledgment that is lawfully executed by a notary public or another officer who is

authorized to take acknowledgments.
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial paper, a signature on it, and
related documents, to the extent allowed by general commercial law.
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute. A signature, document, or anything else that a

federal statute declares to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.
( 11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a

copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown
by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person that must be signed in a

manner that, if falsely made, would subject the signer to criminal penalty under the laws
where the certification was signed. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record - and must make
the record and certification available for inspection - so that the party has a fair
opportunity to challenge them.
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a copy
of a foreign record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a
certification of the custodian or another qualified person that must be signed in a manner
that, if falsely made, would subject the signer to criminal penalty under the laws where
the certification was signed. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record - and must make

the record and certification available for inspection-so that the party has a fair
opportunity to challenge them.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibilit-y. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The amendment to Rule 803(6) and the addition of Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were made
to track the changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the adoption of
Federal Rules 902(11) and 902(12), effective December 1, 2000. The changes to the
federal rules benefit from a federal statute allowing the use of declarations without
notarization. Utah has no comparable statute, so the requirements for declarations used
under the rule are included within the rule itself.
:~

U.S. Const. amend VI

Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
infonned of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
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SIM GiLL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JAMES COPE, Bar No. 0726
Deputy District Attorney
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE #400
SALT LAI<E CITY, UT 84111
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Telephone: (801)363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

Screened by: JAMES COPE
Assigned to: STEVEN GREEN

Plaintiff,

INFORMATION
vs.
DAO# 13009014

DEBBIE ClllLD LARSEN
DOB:-

AKA: J)ehhi Child, J)ebbie Cox Child,
Debbie Cox, Debbi Larsen

ECR Status: ECR
Initial Appearance:
Bail: $5,000
Warrant/Release: NOT BOOKED

D.L.#-

OTN
SO#

Case No.

CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE

Co-Deft DAO #13009015

DOB:Defendant(s .
The undersigned Pat Mount - Salt Lake City Police Department, Agency Case No. 1327 621, upon a written declaration states on information and belief that the defendant, DEBBIE
CHILD LARSEN, committed the crime(s) of:
COUNTl
FORGERY, 76-6-501(2) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about February 04,
2013 at 1710 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did , with
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated
by anyone,
(a) alter any writing of another without his authority or uttered the altered writing; or
(b) make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the ·
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication
or utterance:

STATE vs DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
DAO# 13009014
Page 2
(i) purported to be the act of another, whether the person was existent or nonexistent;

(ii) purported to be an act on behalf of another party without the authority of that other party; or
(iii) purported to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was
in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
COUNT2
THEFT BY DECEPTION, 76-6-405 UCA, Class A Misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about
February 04, 2013 at 1710 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake Cowity, State of Utah, the
defendant did obtain or exercise control over the property of another by deception, with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said property was or exceeded $500, but
was less than $1,500.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Pat Mount, Troy Hyde, David Timmerman.

DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
Your declarant bases the Information upon the following:
The statement of Troy Hyde, owner of LG Warehousing located in Salt Lake County that
while reviewing hls company finances he noticed four checks that appeared to be payroll checks
were cashed at different Wells Fargo Bank branches. Mr. Hyde stated that his company payroll
is managed through a different company and not Wells Fargo. Mr. Hyde stated that one of the
checks had a telephone number on it for one suspect, Defendant DEBBIE LARSEN. Mr. Hyde
made contact with the defendant who admitted that she cashed a check and asked Hyde if she
could pay him back.
On February 4, 2013, Defendant DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN entered the Wells Fargo
Bank branch located at 1710 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, and presented check
number to be cashed. The check was made payable to the defendant, drawn on Wells
Fargo Bank a c c o u n _ , and issued to LG Warehousing for the amount of $971.48.
On February 4, 2013, I)efendant CHRJSTIAN PAUL HALE entered the Wells Fargo
Bank branch located at 1095 East 2100 South, Salt Lake County, and presented check number
to be cashed. The check was made payable to the defendant, drawn on Wells Fargo
Bank account _ , and issued to LG Warehousing for the amount of$987.05.

•

STATE vs DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
DAO# 13009014
Page3
The statement of Salt Lake City Police Officer P. Mount that he compared both
defendants booking photos with the Wells Fargo Bank video surveillance photos and detennined
that they are the same individuals. Officer Mount showed a video surveillance photo of
Defendant HALE to Defendant LARSEN and she positively identified CHRIS as the person in
the surveillance photo,
Post..Miranda, Defendant LARSEN admitted to Officer Mowit she got the check from her
long..time friend, JD Cook, and that Cook bought a sheet of LG Warehousing checks from
"Berta" and is using the sheet of checks to reproduce the checks and cash all over the Salt Lake
Valley.
The Court is notified that Defendant HALE is subject to enhanced penalties in that he has
been twice before convicted of Theft in the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, under
#131902001, and in the Third District Court, West Jordan Department, under #131400403.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B~5--705
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.

~wt
Declarant

Authorized for presentment and filing
SIM GILL, District Attorney

. uty District Attorney
9. day of May, 2013
M/SRB/DAO #13009014

SO# OTN
DAO# 13009014
IN THE THlRP DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Before:._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Plaintiff,
Magistrate
vs.

DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
DOB:-

WARRANT OF ARREST

AKA: Debbi Child, Debbie Cox Child,
Debbie Cox, Debbi Larsen
SS#-

Case No.

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH;
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah, Greetings:

An Infonnation, based upon a written declaration having been declared by Pat Mount SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Agency Case No. 13-27621, and it appears from
the Information or Declaration filed with the lnfonnation, that there is probable cause to believe
that the public offense(s) of;
FORGERY, Third Degree Felony, THEFT BY DECEPTION, Class A Misdemeanor, has been
committed, and that DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN has committed them.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to an-est the above~named defendant
forthwith and bring the defendant before this Court, or before the nearest or most accessible
magistrate for setting bail. If the defendant has fled justice, you shall pursue the defendant into
any other county of this state and there arrest the defendant. The Court finds reasonable grounds
to believe defendant will not appear upon a summons.
Bail is set in the amount of $5,000.
Dated this

/'0

day of

-

May

-

A.D. 20_1:3'·= --~:- ,,._.,_

Z~"-~~Y t-: ' ..

This W :a.~:~'ii5t b'¢:s_erved day or night.
Ct)

,'A-•;.•,·.- ,· .

t {~ f ::·:·: ·: .
!. · , _} ,..·, , ••t.,_
'.;;;:·
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;

SERVED DATE:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BY _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ __
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony
Defendants CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE, DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN, are
linked.
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-6-501(2) - FORGERY 3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: February 04, 2013
Disposition: June 21, 2013 Transferred
Charge 2 - 76-6-405 -_THEFT BY DECEPTIO~ Class A Misdemeanor
Offense Date: February 04, 2013·
Disposition: June 21, 2013 Transferred
·CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JUDGE ECR
PARTIES
Defendant - DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Also Known As - DEBBI CHILD (LARSEN, DEBBIE CHILD)
Also Known As - DEBBIE COX CHILD (LARSEN, DEBBIE CHILD)
@

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
Date of Birth: March 08, 1967
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE
LEA Case Number: 13-27621
Prosecuting Agenc'y: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: 13009014
Sheriff Office Number:
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
CASE NOTE

DAO 13009014 / ECR / West Jordan/LDA APPOINTED

PROCEEDINGS
05-10-13 Case filed

Printed: 05/15/15 16:16:20
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CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony

05-10-13 Filed: From an Information

05-10-13 Filed: Information
05-10-13 Note: Case filed by Pat Mount - SLC Police Dept.
Deft not
booked -- warrant issued.
05-10-13 Warrant ordered on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306629 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
5000.00
05-10-13 Warrant issued on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306629 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
5000.00
Judge: SU CHON
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement.
06-03-13 INITIAL APPEARANCE/DEFT. SET scheduled on June 10, 2013 at
08:30 AM in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH.
06-03-13 Judge JAMES BLANCH assigned.
06-03-13 Note: Deft. called to set court date
06-10-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for INITIAL APPEARANCE
Judge:
SU CHON
PRESENT
Clerk:
cyndiav
Prosecutor: TAN, PATRICK s
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MCDOUGALL IV, ISAAC E
Audio
Tape Number:

CR

831

i

1~

.<;;;)

Tape Count: 11:43-44

HEARING
This matter is before the court for an Initial Appearance, which
the defendant scheduled. The defendant is not present. The court
orders the outstanding warrant be recalled and reissued in the
amount of $10,000.
06-10-13 Warrant recalled on: June 10, 2013 Warrant num: 985306629
Recall reason: Based upon Court Order.
06-10-13 Notice - WARRANT for Case 131904477 ID 15278002
06-10-13 Warrant ordered on: June 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985309395 Bail
Allowed
5000,00
Bail amount:

Printed: 05/15/15 16:16:20
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CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony

06-10-13 Warrant issued on: June 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985309395 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
5000.00
Judge: SU CHON
Issue reason: Failure to appear for mandatory court
appearance
06-14-13 INITIAL APP/WARRANT/DEFT SET scheduled on June 19, 2013 at
08:30 AM in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH.
06-14-13 Note: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN called to schedule a court date.
Advised defendant the warrant remains outstanding until
she appears.
06-19-13 Filed: Affidavit Requesting Appointment of Legal Defender
(Appointed)
06-19-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
JAMES BLANCH
PRESENT
anthonyh
Clerk:
Prosecutor: APLIN, AARON M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney{s): MCDOUGALL IV, ISAAC E
Audio
Tape Number:
INITIAL

S31

Tape Count: 9:34

APPEARANCE

A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Defendant waives reading of Information.
HEARING
Defendant has decided to opt out of ECR. State withdraws the
offer. Court orders the bail reduced to $5000. The Defendant is to
be booked and Pretrial is to evaluate the Defendant for
supervision. Judge Christiansen is assigned.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Salt Lake Legal

Printed: 05/15/15 16:16:20
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CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony

Defenders to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:

Name:
Address:
City:
Phone:

! •·

Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 East 500 South Suite #300
Salt Lake City UT 84111
801-532-5444

'Gil
I

I
i

Affidavit of indigency has been completed by the defendant
06-19-13 Note: Bail Amount Changed from $10000.00 to $5000.00
06-19-13 Case Closed
Disposition Judge is SU CHON
06-21-13 Warrant recalled on: June 21, 2013 Warrant num: 985309395
Recall reason: Based upon Court Order.
06-21-13 Note: Case Transferred to West Jordan District Case# 131400723
07-19-13 Judge JUDGE ECR assigned.

.Q

.G)
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony
~

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-6-501(2) - FORGERY 3rd Degree Felony (amended) to
3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: February 04, 2013
Plea: September 24, 2013 Not Guilty
Disposition: December OS, 2013 Dismissed (w/o prej)
Charge 2 - 76-6-405 - THEFT BY DECEPTION Class A Misdemeanor
Offense Date: February 04, 2013
Plea: December 05, 2013 Guilty
Disposition: December 05, 2013 Guilty
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
L DOUGLAS HOGAN
PARTIES
Defendant - DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
Represented by: PETER D GOODALL
Also Known As - DEBBI CHILD
Also Known As - DEBBIE COX CHILD
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Bondsman - B & B BAIL BONDS
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
Offense tracking number: 43075761
Date of Birth: March 08, 1967
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE
LEA Case Number: 13-27621
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: 13009014
Sheriff Office Number: 367B51
ACCOUNT

SUMMARY

PAPER BOND TOTALS

Printed~ 05/18/15 15:03:52

Posted:

5,000.00
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony
G;.;

Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
5,000.00
Balance:
0.00
TRUST TOTALS
Trust Due:
1,000.00
Amount Paid:
1,000.00
Credit:
o.oo
Trust Balance Due:
0.00
Balance Payable:
0.00
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety
Posted By: B & B BAIL BONDS {#K340)
Posted:
5,000.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Exonerated:
5,000.00
Balance:
0.00
TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Other Trust
Recipient: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN
Amount Due:
28. 52
Paid In:
2B.52
Paid Out:
28.52

40

TRUST DETAIL

Trust Description: Restitution
Recipient: WELLS FARGO BANK NA
Amount Due:
971. 48
Paid In:
971. 48
Paid Out:
971. 48
Account Adjustments
Date
Amount
Reason
Apr 04, 2014
971. 48
Court Ordered
Apr 04, 2014
-1,871.48
Court Ordered
Apr 17, 2014
Adjustment down due to Account
-28.52
Transfer.

;GJ

CASE NOTE
Prob 18 months SLCP begin 2/11/14
PROCEEDINGS
05-10-13 Case filed by carola
05-10-13 Filed: Information
05-10-13 Warrant Ordered

Printed: 05/18/15 15:03:52
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TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony

TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRA..'I\JSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED
TRANSFERRED

05-10-13 Warrant Issued
06-03-13 INITIAL APPEARANCE/DEFT. SET

06/10/2013

06-10-13 Minutes for INITIAL APPEARANCE

06-10-13 Warrant Recalled
96-10-13 WARRANT for Case 131904477 ID 15278002
06-10-13 Warrant Ordered
06-10-13 Warrant Issued
06-14-13 INITIAL APP/WARRANT/DEFT SET 06/19/2013
06-19-13 Filed: Affidavit Requesting Appointment
06-19-13 Minutes for Initial Appearance
06-21-13 Warrant Recalled
06-21-13 Case filed
06-21-13 Filed: From an Information
06-21-13 Note: Case transferred from Salt Lake City District.

Case

131904477
06-21-13 Judge BRUCE LUBECK assigned.

~

;ii)

06-21-13 Notice - WARRANT for Case 131400723 ID 15303158
06-21-13 Warrant ordered on: June 21, 2013 Warrant Num: 985310699 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
5000.00
06-21-13 Warrant issued on: June 21, 2013 Warrant Num: 985310699 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
5000.00
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Issue reason: Based on Court Order
06-21-13 Judge TERRY CHRISTIANSEN assigned.
06-21-13 SCHEDULING 1 scheduled on July 09, 2013 at 08:45 AM in WJ
Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
06-21-13 SCHEDULING 1 scheduled on July 09, 2013 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
06-27-13 Filed: Appearance of Counsel
06-27-13 Filed: Request for Discovery
06-27-13 Filed: Other Demand that the State Produce the Preparers of all
Reports and Chain of Custody Witnesses at Trial
06-27-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-02-13 Filed: Substitution of Counsel
07-02-13 Filed: Request for Discovery
07-02-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-02-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification

Printed: 05/18/15 15:03:52
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony

07-05-13 Warrant recalled on: July OS, 2013 Warrant num: 985310699
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
booked,
07-09-13 2 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on July 23, 2013 at 08:30 AM
in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
07-09-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 1 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
caseyh
Prosecutor: BOEHM, MICHAEL P
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MASSE, MICHAEL J
Audio
Tape Number:

37

Tape Count: 9:40-41

HEARING
The parties stipulate to continue this matter for additional
review of the case. The court so orders.
2 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 07/23/2013
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 37
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
07-09-13 Filed: B & B BAIL BONDS 5000.00
07-09-13 Bond Account created
Total Due:
5000,00
07-09-13 Bond Posted
Non-Monetary Bond:
5,000.00
07-17-13 Filed: Motion to withdraw as court appointed counsel by
Michael Masse
07-17-13 Note: Paperwork sent to Judge for signature
07-23-13 3 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on August 05, 2013 at 01:30
PM in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
07-23-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 2 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT

Printed: 05/18/15 15:03:52
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony

Clerk:
caseyh
Prosecutor: LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

37

Tape Count: 8:56-57

HEARING

i..ii,

~

The parties stipulate to continue this matter for additional
review of the case. The court so orders.
3 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 08/05/2013
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 37
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
07-23-13 Filed order: Order of withdraw as court appointed counsel
Judge TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Signed July 22, 2013
07-30-13 Filed: First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
08-05-13 4 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on August 19, 2013 at 08:30
AM in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
08-05-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 3 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
caseyh
Prosecutor: HANSEN, MATTHEW J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s}: GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

37

Tape Count: 2:14-15

HEARING
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The parties stipulate to continue this matter for additional
review of the case. The court so orders.
4 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 08/19/2013
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 37
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
08-09-13 Filed: First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
08-19-13 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on September 17, 2013 at 01:30 PM
in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN.
08-19-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 4 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
caseyh
Prosecutor: HAMILTON, TYSON V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

37

Tape Count: 8:45-46

HEARING
Counsel requests this matter be set for a preliminary hearing.
The state does not object. The court so orders.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 09/17/2013
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 37
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
09-17-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing
Judge:
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
PRESENT
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caseyh
Clerk:
Prosecutor: HANSEN, MATTHEW J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

37

Tape Count: 1:55-56

HEARING

Counsel advises that the defendant would like to waive their
right to a preliminary hearing. The state consents to the waiver.
The court reviews the rights the defendant would be giving up and
accepts the waiver. Matter is bound over.
PTC/BO/ARR is scheduled.
Date: 09/24/2013
Time: 08 :30 a.m.

~

~

Location: WJ Courtroom 31
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS
09-17-13 PTC/BO/ARR scheduled on September 24, 2013 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 31 with Judge KOORIS.
09-17-13 Judge MARK KOURIS assigned.
09-24-13 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty
09-24-13 Charge 2 Plea is Not Guilty
09-24-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL
Judge:
MARK KOURIS
PRESENT
Clerk:
salomet
Prosecutor: GREEN, STEVEN J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

31

Tape Count: 8:50

HEARING
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Defendant waive time.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 10/22/2013
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 31
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS
09-24-13 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on October 22, 2013 at 01:30 PM
in WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS.
10-23-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL CONFERENCE continue
Judge:
MARK KOURIS
PRESENT
Clerk:
salomet
Prosecutor: P..A..~SEN, MATTHEW J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D
Video
Tape Number:

31

Tape Count: 2:17

CONTINUANCE
Whose Motion:
The Defendant's counsel PETER D GOODALL.
Reason for continuance:
Request of counsel
The motion is granted.
FINAL DISPO is scheduled.
Date: 12/05/2013
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 31
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS
10-23-13 FINAL DISPO continued to December 05, 2013 at 08:30 AM in WJ
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Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS.
12-05-13 Filed: PSR requested from SLCP
12-05-13 Charge 76-6-501(2) Sev F3 was amended to 76-6-501(2) Sev F3
12-05-13 Charge 76-6-405 Sev MA was amended to 76-6-405 Sev MA
12-05-13 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed
12-05-13 Charge 2 Disposition is Guilty
12-05-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea
Judge:
MARK KOURIS
PRESENT
Clerk:
salomet
Prosecutor: HANSEN, MATTHEW J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

~

31

Tape Count: 9:47

A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders S.L. County Probation Services to prepare a
Pre-sentence report.
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an
enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense.
SENT/SLCPS is scheduled.
Date: 01/28/2014
Time: o8: 3 o a. m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 31
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS
12-05-13 SENT/SLCPS scheduled on January 28, 2014 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS.
12-05-13 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony
12-06-13 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in advance of Guilty Plea.
Judge MARK KOURIS
Signed December 05, 2013
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01-21-14 ****PROTECTED**** Filed: Pre Sentence Investigation Report
01-28-14 SENT/SLCPS 2 continued to February 11, 2014 at 08:30 AM in WJ
Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS.
01-28-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING continued
Judge:
MARK KOURIS
PRESENT
melisses
Clerk:
Prosecutor: WAYMENT, DAVID HT
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s}: GOODALL, PETER D
Audio
Tape Number:

31

Tape Count: 8.41

CONTINUANCE
Whose Motion:
The Defendant.
Reason for continuance:
Defendant 1 s request
The motion is granted.
SENT/SLCPS 2 is scheduled.
Date: 02/11/2014
Time: 08 :30 a.m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 31
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS
02-11-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME
Judge:
MARK KOURIS
PRESENT
Clerk:
salomet
Prosecutor: WAYMENT, DAVID HT
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s}: GOODALL, PETER D

Sheriff Office#: 367851
Audio
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Tape Number:

31

Tape Count: 9:31

ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
DEBBI CHILD
DEBBIE COX CHILD
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant 1 s conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
COMMUNITY SERVICE

Complete 50 hour(s) of community service.
Community service to be completed through S.L. County Probation
Services.
SENTENCE COMMUNITY SERVICE NOTE
Complete 50 hours of community service at the rate of 5 hours per
month. The first 5 hours due in May 1, 2014. Thereafter, due on the
first of each month.
ORDER OF PROBATION

The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by S.L. County Probation Services.
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
No other violations.
Report to Salt Lake County Probation within 24 hours.
Enter into and complete any treatment recommended by Salt Lake
County Probation.
Notify the court of any address change.
Not to possess or consume alcohol or non prescribed contol
substances.
Random urinalysis and drug testing as requested.
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent.
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or
alcohol are sold.
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Complete a substance abuse evaluation and comply with all
recommended treatment.
Defendant probation with Salt Lake Probation Service for a period
of 18 months.
Successfully complete a dual focus substance abuse and follow
through with any treatment recommended.
All of the drugs and alcohol condition will be in place.
Any prescribed medication notify SLCP Agnet,
No alcohol entire time on probation.
Submit to random urine analysis testing.
Pay a restitution of $1,900 in the amount of $50 per month. The
first $50 due in May 1, 2014. Thereafter, due on the first of each
month.
Restitution will remain open for 90 days.
All of the standard and ordinary conditions from AP&P will apply.
02-11-14 Filed: SLC Probation Referral
-5,000.00
02-12-14 Bond Exonerated
Total Due:
02-12-14 Trust Account created
1900.00
02-12-14 Filed: Letters Re: Defendant
02-12-14 Note: Added to payment schedule 1060089334
02-12-14 Filed: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment.
02-14-14 Filed: Motion for Restitution
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
02-14-14 ****PROTECTED**** Filed: Protected Victim Information
1,000.00
Payment Received:
02-21-14 Restitution
Note: Mail Payment;
03-25-14 Note: emailed Barbara@ DA's office regarding Order on
Restitution.
03-27-14 Filed: State's Request to Submit for Decision
03-27-14 Note: E-filing to Judge
04-04-14 Filed order: Order for Restitution
Judge MARK KOORIS
Signed April 04, 2014
Total Due:
971.48
04-04-14 Restitution adjusted to $2871.48
Reason: Court Ordered
Total Due:
971.48
04-04-14 Restitution adjusted to $1000.00
Reason: Court Ordered
04-08-14 Restitution Check#
45245 Trust Payout:
971.48
04-08-14 Note: Defendant paid $1,000.00 prior to sentencing, Order of
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04-08-14
~

04-10-14
04-17-14

..i)

04-17-14
04-17-14

04-17-14
04-21-14
04-22-14
04-30-14
05-06-14

06-12-14
02-13-15

Restitution to the victim is $971.48. A balance of
$28.52 is remaining.
Filed: Money in Trust - $28.52 balance remaining after paying
restitution - give to J-Kouris for Decision.
Note: Trust Check Mailed Out
Filed order: Money in Trust - Court orders $28.52 in
restitution be released to the Defendant.
Judge MARK KOURIS
Signed April 15, 2014
Trust Account created
Total Due:
28.52
Restitution
-28.52
Note: Judicial Order - Account Transfer; Over payment of
restitution to be refunded to defendant
Other Trust
Transfer In:
28.52
Other Trust Check#
45299 Trust Payout:
28.52
Note: Other trust check mailed
Note: *Trust check(45299) sent to Debbie Larsen is returned to
the Court. No new address has been provided by the USPS.
Note: Called Mr. Goodall, ATD - He requested that the check be
mailed to him and he will get it to his client. Check
#45299 for $28.52 remailed this date.
****PRIVATE**** Filed: Substance abuse and Mental Health
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN assigned.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE
CASE NUMBER 131904476 State Felony
Defendants CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE, DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN, are
linked.
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-6-501(2) - FORGERY 3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: February 04, 2013
Plea: June 06, 2013 Guilty
Disposition: June 06, 2013 Guilty
Charge 2 - 76-6-405 - THEFT BY DECEPTION 3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date: February 04, 2013
Disposition: June 06, 2013 Dismissed (w/o prej}
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JUDGE ECR
PARTIES
Defendant - CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE
Represented by: KIMBERLY A CLARK
Plaintiff - . STATE OF UTAH
~

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE
Offense tracking number: 43043553
Date of Birth: January 31, 1967
Jail Booking Number: 13026841
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE
LEA Case Number: 13-27621
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: 13009015
Sheriff Office Number: 155467
ACCOUNT SUMl\fARY

TRUST TOTALS

Trust Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Trust Balance Due:

Printe~: 05/15/15 16:16:52
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Balance Payable:
0. 00 .
TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Interest on Rstitutn
Recipient: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT.
Amount Due:
0.00
Paid In:
0.00
Pai.d Out:
0.00
Account Adjustments
Date
Amount
Reason
Interest Posted to Date
Jun 07, 2013
0.06
Adjusted to zero and set to
Jun 07, 2013
-0.06
State Debt Collection
TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Restitution
Recipient: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT.
Amount Due:
0.00
Paid In:
0,00
Paid Out:
0.00
Account Adjustments
Reason
Date
Amount
Adjusted to zero and set to
Jun 07, 2013
-987.05
State Debt Collection
CASE NOTE

DAO 13009015 / ECR / West Jordan/LDA APPOINTED
PROCEEDINGS
05-10-13 Case filed
05-10-13 Filed: From an Information
05-10-13 Filed: Information
05-10-13 Note: Case filed by Pat Mount - SLC Police Dept. Deft not
booked -- warrant issued.
05-10-13 Warrant ordered on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306628 Bail
Allowed
Bail amount:
5000.00
05-10-13· Warrant issued on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306628 Bail
Allowed
5000,00
Bail amount:
Judge: SU CHON
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement.
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05-31-13 INITIAL APPEARANCE/JAIL scheduled on June 04, 2013 at 01:30 PM
in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH.
05-31-13 Warrant recalled on: May 31, 2013 Warrant num: 985306628
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was
booked.
05-31-13 Judge JAMES BLANCH assigned.
06-03-13 Filed order: Declaration - LOA Appointed
Judge SU CHON
Signed June 03, 2013
06-04-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel
Judge:
JAMES BLANCH
PRESENT

Clerk:
katiem
Prosecutor: SHUMAN, JON D
Defendant
Defendant's At~orney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A
Sheriff Office#: 155467
Audio
Tape Number:
S31
Tape Count: 3:20
INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Defendant waives reading of Information.
Advised of charges and penalties.
HEARING
TIME: 3:20 PM Defendant present from ADC. Defense requests to
continue the matter for two days and gives basis.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Salt Lake Legal
Defenders to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: Salt Lake Legal Defenders
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Address: 424 East 500 South Suite #101
City: Salt Lake City UT 84111
Phone: 532-5444
Affidavit of indigency has been c~mpleted by the defendant
ECR STATUS CONF #1/JAIL is scheduled.
Date: 06/06/2013
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Arraignment - S31
Third District Court
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: JAMES BLANCH
06-04-13 ECR STATUS CONF #1/JAIL scheduled on June 06, 2013 at 01:30 PM
in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH.
06-06-13 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
06-06-13 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed
06-06-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea
Judge:
JAMES BLANCH
PRESENT
katiem
Clerk:
Prosecutor: APLIN, AARON M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A
Sheriff Office#: 155467
Audio
Tape Count: 3:30
Tape Number:
S31
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
HEARING
TIME~

charged with count two to be dismissed.
Court regarding the recommendations.
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Defendant waives the right to preliminary hearing and the Court
binds the matter over to the District Court.
Court orders the defendant to serve 270 day jai.1 with credit
granted for 8 days time served and to run concurrent with any other
sentence serving. Court orders case to be closed. Court orders
restitution be sent to the Office of State Debt Collection.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 270 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 8 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE

~

Court orders the defendant to serve 270 day jail with credit
granted for 8 days time served and to run concurrent with any other
sentence serving.
Restitution
Amount: $987.05 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT.
06-06-13 Trust Account created
Total Due:
987.05
06-06-13 Filed order: Signed Minutes - Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
Judge JAMES BLANCH
Signed June 06, 2013
06-06-13 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
and Certificate of Counsel
Judge JAMES BLANCH
Signed June 06, 2013
06-07-13 Trust Account created
Total Due:
0.00
06-07-13 Note: Case sent to State Debt. Collection
06-07-13 Judgment #1 Entered$ 987.11
Creditor: STATE DEBT COLLECTION
Creditor: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT.
Debtor:
CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE
987.05 Restitution
Creditor: STATE DEBT COLLECTION
Creditor: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT.
Debtor:
CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE
0.06 Interest on Rstitutn
987.11 Judgment Grand Total
06-24-13 Filed: Appearance of Counsel
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06-24-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
07-19-13 Judge JUDGE ECR assigned.
11-20-13 Filed: Motion FOR CATS REVIEW
Filed by: HALE, CHRISTIAN PAUL
11-20-13 Filed: Order (Proposed) FOR CATS REVIEW

11-20-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
11-21-13 Filed: Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed) FOR CATS
REVIEW
11-21-13 Note: CATS review denied. Sentence does not mention CATS or
early release, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to modify
it.
11-21-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
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